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When the ACLU filed suit against Maryland in 1994 on behalf of a class of
at-risk students in Baltimore, the city schools were spending $5873 per pupil.'
By 2003, per-pupil spending in Baltimore had risen to $8926,2 and under
current law is projected to grow to $13,496 in 200 8.3 Relative to this
remarkable infusion of resources, the Maryland litigation has received little
recent attention in the scholarly literature.4 The primary reason is that Maryland
settled its school finance case, and the litigation never produced a Maryland
Supreme Court opinion on the merits. The case consequently flies below the
radar screen of most school finance litigation studies.
This Essay aims to correct that deficiency. By examining the experience of
Maryland, it explores the complexity of modem school finance litigation. The
t J.D., Yale Law School, 2004. The author would like to thank Professor James Ryan, Meg
Gleason, Inayat Delawala, Elizabeth Nathan, and all the people who gave so freely of their time to be
interviewed for this Essay.
1. MD. STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., SELECTED FINANCIAL DATA: MARYLAND PUBLIC SCHOOLS 2000-
2001 (pt. 4) 15 tbl.15 (2002), available at http://www.msde.state.md.us/SpecialReportsandData/
financial data 2003/PART401.pdf.
2. Md. State Dep't of Educ., Maryland's Report Card: 2003 Performance Report: Baltimore City, at
http://msp.msde.state.md.us/otherfactors.asp?K=30AAAA (last visited Apr. 19, 2004).
3. Baltimore will spend $1,242,900,000 on education in fiscal year 2008. DEP'T OF LEGISLATIVE
SERVS., FISCAL NOTE FOR SENATE BILL 856 exhibit 10 (2002), available at http://mlis.state.md.us/PDF-
Documents/2002rs/fnotes/bil_0006/sb0856.PDF [hereinafter DEP'T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS.]. The State
estimates that Baltimore will enroll 92,092 pupils in that year. Compare id. at exhibit 8, with id. at
exhibit 9.
4. Most discussions of the Maryland litigation focus on the period before 1999 and do not address
the long-term implementation of the remedy. See MARION ORR, BLACK SOCIAL CAPITAL: THE POLITICS
OF SCHOOL REFORM IN BALTIMORE, 1986-1998, at 165-184 (1999); Diane W. Cipollone, Gambling on
a Settlement: the Baltimore City Schools Adequacy Litigations, 24 J. EDUC. FIN. 87 (1998); Susan P.
Leviton & Matthew H. Joseph, An Adequate Education for All Maryland's Children: Morally Right,
Economically Necessary, and Constitutionally Required, 52 MD. L. REV. 1137 (1993); Timothy Ayers,
Note, Adequacy in Baltimore City Schools: Why the Consent Decree in Bradford v. Maryland Is Right, 5
GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY 77 (1997). But see Molly A. Hunter, Advocacy Ctr. for Children's Educ.
Success, Maryland Enacts Modern, Standards-Based Education Finance System: Reforms Based on
"Adequacy" Cost Study and Parallel Court Funding Principles, at http://www.accessednetwork.org/
resources/mdbrief4-02.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2004).
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Maryland litigation serves as a fascinating reminder that adequacy is not a
monolithic concept, and plaintiffs who make the decision to sue under an
adequacy theory rather than an equity theory nevertheless face numerous
strategic choices. They must decide whether to sue on behalf of a school district
or a class of students. They must develop a working definition of adequacy.
They must decide whether to focus exclusively on money or whether to seek
more comprehensive school reform. They must operate simultaneously as
litigants in a legal system and as political actors in a larger struggle. They must
consider the impact of fiscal constraints and business cycles on the stability of
the remedy they seek. They must decide how to wield the threat of litigation
and when it is appropriate to drop their legal claims in pursuit of short-term
gains. And in the end, they must assess whether litigation itself can improve
academic achievement in the face of entrenched social problems. Many of these
questions have no clear answer, but by telling the story of school finance
litigation in Maryland, this Essay documents how litigants in one state grappled
with these issues and assesses how their choices impacted the course of the
litigation.
The Essay focuses on four themes. First, it examines the efficacy of suing
on behalf of a class of at-risk children rather than representing a school district.
Maryland provides a good basis for comparing these two approaches because
the litigation involved both kinds of plaintiffs: the ACLU filed its case,
Bradford v. Maryland State Board of Education, as a class action, while the
City of Baltimore, in Mayor v. Maryland, sued on behalf of its school system.
The legal claims in the two cases were almost identical. Indeed, the judge
overseeing the litigation combined the cases, and this Essay generally refers to
the merged litigation simply as the Bradford case. Nevertheless, the ACLU
gained considerable flexibility by deciding to sue on behalf of a class of at-risk
students, and repeatedly found itself in the position of advocating more
forcefully for the interests of the schoolchildren than Baltimore, which felt
constrained by its need to maintain a positive long-term relationship with the
state on multiple fronts.
Second, this Essay analyzes the decision by both the ACLU and the City to
settle the Bradford suit. Settlement required the plaintiffs to make sacrifices
and accept an interim remedy they considered underfunded, but it gave them
considerably more control over the remedial stage of the litigation. State
supreme courts that strike down their school finance systems often fail to
provide lawmakers with much guidance about how to construct a constitutional
system. The resulting uncertainty gives opponents of reform an opportunity to
whittle down the gains made in court and can even leave legislatures that try to
comply in good faith unable to craft a stable remedy. The settlement in
Maryland avoided these problems. It allowed the plaintiffs and sympathetic
figures within state government to negotiate the details of the remedy in
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advance and present the legislature with a comprehensive plan for an up-or-
down vote rather than a vague command to bring the system into compliance
with amorphous constitutional standards.
Third, the Essay examines the legislative battle surrounding the initial
school finance remedy and its expansion five years later. It focuses in particular
on the decision by the legislature in both instances to broaden the remedy and
provide additional funding for needy students in districts across the entire state
that were never involved with the litigation. This broadening substantially
enhanced the stability of the remedy by giving every district a stake in the long-
term health of the funding formula. The broadening also mimicked the result
that would have been achieved if the ACLU had sued on behalf of a statewide
class of at-risk students, shedding light on the potential for a strategy of
statewide litigation in future adequacy cases.
Finally, the Essay attempts to understand why race played such a
surprisingly small role in the Maryland litigation given Baltimore's status as a
predominantly African-American school district in a largely white state.
Although considerations of race were certainly present, the plaintiffs
deemphasized race and were largely successful in their efforts to frame the
public debate in race-neutral terms. Dispelling the perception that only minority
students would benefit from the new funding formula represented a
considerable accomplishment in light of the polarizing influence race has
traditionally exerted in school finance litigation. The decision to exclude race
entirely, however, limited the nature of the Bradford remedy by eliminating the
(remote) option of pursuing integration as a remedy. The Bradford case
accordingly tests the effectiveness of providing an urban school district with an
infusion of resources in the absence of either socioeconomic or racial
integration.
The early progress of reform has been promising, an encouraging result
given the current unlikeliness of plaintiffs seeking integration to prevail, but the
situation deserves monitoring: If reform stagnates, it will once again call into
question the effectiveness of trying to help urban school systems without tying
their fate to that of suburban schools.
I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO MARYLAND
Maryland is the eighteenth most populous state,5 but it contains five of the
fifty largest school districts in the nation. 6 School districts in Maryland are
5. 2004 COUNTY AND CITY EXTRA: ANNUAL METRO, CITY, AND COUNTY DATA BOOK 27 tbl.1
(Dierdre A. Gaquin & Katherine A. DeBrandt eds., 12th ed. 2004).
6. COMM'N. ON EDUC. FIN., EQUITY, & EXCELLENCE, PRELIMINARY REPORT app. 2 (2000),
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/other/education/Toc.htm [hereinafter THORNTON COMMISSION,
PRELIMINARY REPORT].
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unusually large because they correspond to the political boundaries of
Maryland's twenty-three counties and one self-governing city. Like districts in
thirteen other states, school districts in Maryland are fiscally dependent on
county and state government, meaning that local school boards lack
independent power to levy taxes. 7 The large size of Maryland's school districts
has historically contributed to a relatively equitable distribution of funding in
the state. In 1998, just as the school finance remedy was in its early stages of
implementation, the highest-spending district in the state spent only 1.4 times
as much as the lowest-spending district, and 87.5% of all Maryland students
attended school in districts spending within twelve percent of the state
average. In neighboring Virginia, the ratio was 2.34 to 1, and only fifty percent
of students resided in districts spending within twelve percent of the state
average.9 Districts achieved this relative equality despite receiving only forty
percent of their funding from the State, the thirteenth lowest level of state
support in the nation.
10
Maryland contains a broad mix of communities. The Eastern Shore of the
Chesapeake Bay and Western Maryland are rural and overwhelmingly white.
The Baltimore-Washington corridor, home to most of the state's wealth, is
predominantly suburban and majority white. At both ends of the corridor lie
Maryland's two majority black jurisdictions. On the Washington side is Prince
George's County, the wealthiest majority-black county in the country, but one
experiencing a rapid influx of poorer residents from Washington, D.C. On the
opposite end is Baltimore, Maryland's only urban jurisdiction and its most
troubled.
Baltimore suffers from a typical array of urban problems. According to the
2000 Census, the city's poverty rate of 21.1% and median household income of
$30,564 made Baltimore the fourteenth poorest large city in the nation.11 The
number of drug addicts in Baltimore hovered around 60,000, roughly eight
percent of the city's population, throughout the 1990s. 12 Baltimore also
grapples with a declining population fueled by an exodus of middle-class
blacks. The city lost 11.5% of its population in the 1990s, 13 earning it the
dubious distinction of being the fastest shrinking major city in America.
These urban ills have left their mark on the Baltimore schools. The year
before the Bradford suit was filed, 68.7% of students in Baltimore were eligible
7. See id. at app. 2 exhibit 2 (2000).
8. Id. at app. 2.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Eric Siegel, A Survey of City's Woes, BALT. SUN, Nov. 29, 2001, at 2B.
12. See Jonathan Kaufman, Prison Is All Around for a Girl Growing Up in Inner-City Baltimore,
WALL. ST. J., Oct. 27, 1998, at Al.
13. Siegel, supra note 11.
Vol. 22:571, 2004
Settling Without "Settling"
for free or reduced-price lunch. 14 In 1996, the Baltimore Sun described the
plight of the city schools in stark terms:
Two of every three children live in poverty. With their families unable to afford
stable housing, nearly one of four changes schools during the year. One of five is
absent from school each day. One of six receives special education. One of seven
drops out of high school.1
5
In addition to its poverty, the Baltimore school system has experienced three
decades of growing racial isolation. By 1995, 159 of Baltimore's 184 schools
were majority black.' 6
II. THE LAWSUIT
A. The Shadow ofHombeck
To understand the success of the Bradford suit, it is important to look back
more than a decade at a notable failure-the first Maryland school finance case.
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board of Education17 began in 1978 when three
rural districts and Baltimore City filed suit against the State Board of
Education. The plaintiffs sued under a traditional equity theory. They claimed
that disparities in district wealth prevented poor districts from spending as
much money on their schools as wealthier districts, despite taxing themselves at
higher rates.' 8 They further argued that the formula for distributing state aid
failed to close this gap, and in some cases exacerbated the disparities. The
plaintiffs based their suit on the education clause of the Maryland Constitution,
which requires the State to maintain a "thorough and efficient" system of free
public schools, 19 the state due process clause, 20 and the federal Equal Protection
Clause.
The plaintiffs won at the trial level before Circuit Judge David Ross, who
ordered the statewide equalization of school funding. The Court of Appeals,
Maryland's highest court, granted direct review and reversed. Judge Murphy,
14. Tracey A. Reeves, Legislative Fight for Funds, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2000, at M3.
15. Eric Siegel & Jean Thompson, Making Money Work for Schools, BALT. SUN, Nov. 24, 1996, at
lB.
16. See James Bock, "Resegregated" Schools Not All Bad, Some Say, BALT. SUN, May 20, 1996, at
1A.
17. 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983).
18. For example, the same tax rate that would have raised $2766 per pupil in Calvert County only
would have raised $699 in neighboring St. Mary's County and $568 in Baltimore. Issues of municipal
overburden aside, Baltimore needed to tax itself at more than 4.8 times the rate of Calvert County just to
spend an equal nominal amount on its schools. See Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458
A.2d 758, 766 (Md. 1983).
19. MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (requiring "a thorough and efficient System of Free Public Schools").
20. MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XXIV. The Maryland Court of Appeals has interpreted the state due
process clause to contain an equal protection guarantee. See Att'y Gen. v. Waldron, 426 A.2d 929, 940-
41 (Md. 1981) ("Although the Maryland Constitution contains no express equal protection clause, we
deem it settled that this concept of equal treatment is embodied in the due process requirement of Article
24 of the Declaration of Rights.").
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writing for the majority, looked to the history of the education clause and noted
that Maryland had amended its constitution in 1867 to replace the word
"uniform" with the phrase "thorough and efficient." The Court of Appeals
interpreted this change to preclude the type of equalization order by Judge
Ross.
As for the equal protection claims in Hornbeck, the Court of Appeals
largely followed the Supreme Court's reasoning in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez.21 Judge Murphy worried that equalizing education
funding would push the court down a slippery slope toward equalizing funding
for police and fire protection, welfare, and other social services. 22 He avoided
this perceived danger by concluding that education was not a fundamental right
under the state constitution. 23 He then proceeded to apply the rational basis test,
holding, as in Rodriguez, that the state interest in preserving local control over
education justified toleration of finance disparities among districts. 24
Hornbeck cast a long shadow. It served as a cautionary tale for others
considering litigation as a tool for reforming Maryland's school finance system.
The Hornbeck litigants had poured four years of effort into taking the case from
its earliest stages through a four-month trial to the final decision in the Court of
Appeals. Not only had they emerged empty-handed, but they had expended
substantial sums of money that otherwise could have been used for education.
In the wake of the Court of Appeals decision, advocates turned their attention
for over a decade to lobbying in Annapolis.
B. From Hornbeck to Bradford
In 1994, the ACLU of Maryland lost patience with lobbying on behalf of
school finance reform and began considering its legal options. It hoped that a
new court case would force action in Annapolis and serve as a focal point for
reform efforts. But the ACLU still had to grapple with the shadow of
Hornbeck. Rulings denying school finance equalization tend to remain
entrenched as precedents. The Supreme Court laid the groundwork for this
entrenchment in Rodriguez when it announced that courts should determine
whether a right is fundamental under the federal Constitution by looking to text
and history rather than solely to the importance of the right to society. 25 Despite
disclaiming strict adherence to the Rodriguez test, the Maryland Court of
Appeals adopted a similar backward-looking method of constitutional
21. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
22. Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 785.
23. Id. at 786 (concluding that education is not a fundamental right but distinguishing the "overly
simplistic articulation of.the fundamental rights test set forth in Rodriguez").
24. Id. at 788.
25. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973).
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26interpretation that left future plaintiffs little room to distinguish Hornbeck.
Future plaintiffs could not rely on the shift from heavy industry to an
information-based economy. Nor could they distinguish Hornbeck with social
science data demonstrating the positive correlation between education and
various life outcomes. Overturning Hornbeck would have instead required a
direct assault on the court's interpretation of the 1867 Constitutional
Convention.
Even without the complications created by Hornbeck, the ACLU did not
necessarily want to sue under an equity theory.2 7 Instituting a system of fiscal
neutrality would not have guaranteed significant funding increases for
Baltimore, since reductions in the City's tax effort, the highest in the state,
could have offset much of the benefit derived from a new funding formula.
More importantly, the ACLU believed that students in Baltimore required more
resources than students elsewhere in the state because of their exposure to
28pervasive and persistent social problems. To reach this goal, the ACLU would
have been forced to convince the courts both to read an equity requirement into
the Maryland Constitution and to interpret the text as mandating vertical
equity.
29
The ACLU responded to these concerns like litigants in other states by
adopting an adequacy theory. Adequacy allowed the ACLU to litigate on a
clean slate. In fact, Hornbeck had explicitly left the door open for adequacy.
The Court of Appeals noted:
No evidentiary showing was made in the present case-indeed no allegation was
even advanced-that [the State's] qualitative standards were not being met in any
school district, or that the standards failed to make provision for an adequate
education .... Simply to show that the educational resources available in the poorer
school districts are inferior to those in the rich districts does not mean that there is
insufficient funding provided by the State's financing system for all students to
obtain an adequate education.
30
Adequacy had gained further legitimacy after Hornbeck through a series of
victories in Kentucky,31 Massachusetts,32 Alabama,33 and Arizona.3 4
26. See Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 786 ("We agree with the view expressed in Rodriguez that whether
a claimed right is fundamental does not turn alone on the relative desirability or importance of that
right.").
27. Interview with Susan Goering, Executive Director, ACLU of Maryland, in Baltimore, Md. (Jan.
23, 2003) [hereinafter Goering Interview].
28. Id.
29. In contrast to horizontal equity, which mandates equal expenditures for all students, vertical
equity calls for spending in proportion to student need, with the greatest amount of resources directed to
the neediest students.
30. Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 780.
3 1. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
32. See McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
33. See Ala. Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, No. CV-90-883-R (Ala. Cir. Ct. Apr. 1, 1993),
reprinted in Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107 app. (Ala. 1993).
34. See Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994).
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C. The ACLU Complaint
The ACLU filed its complaint in Circuit Court on December 6, 1994.
Unlike the adequacy cases in Kentucky and Massachusetts, which were brought
on behalf of entire school districts, the ACLU represented a class of at-risk
students in Baltimore. 35 The class included more than 70,000 current students
and an indeterminate number of future students at risk of educational failure.
36
A group of parents and students represented the class, and the case was
captioned Bradford v. Maryland State Board of Education after Keith Bradford,
the father of three young children in Baltimore.
The strategy of representing a class of students rather than the district itself
paid large dividends as the litigation progressed. As discussed throughout this
Essay, suing on behalf of a class of students allowed the ACLU to focus
exclusively on the interests of the parents and children it represented.
Baltimore, in contrast, found itself caught in a complex web of political trade-
offs. It had to consider whether pressing for educational aid would jeopardize
other goals and could not afford to take a strong stand on school reform as
readily as the ACLU.37 As Susan Goering, Executive Director of the ACLU of
Maryland, put it: "The advantage of doing it independently is that we did not
have to depend on the political winds that were blowing at any given
moment.' 3 8
The ACLU complaint alleged that Maryland's education clause required the
state to provide every child with an "adequate education as measured by
contemporary education standards." 39 The complaint avoided locking itself into
a single definition of adequacy, and instead it looked to deficiencies in both the
resources available to students in Baltimore and the outputs produced. The
complaint placed particular emphasis on the failure of students in Baltimore to
meet the state's own achievement standards. Maryland was one of the first
states in the country to implement a system of standards-based reform. The
centerpiece of the program was the Maryland School Performance Assessment
35. The ACLU defined the class of "at-risk" students broadly to include students who: (1) lived in
poverty, as measured by eligibility for free and reduced-price school meals; (2) attended schools where
more than thirty percent of students live in poverty; (3) lived in single-parent households; (4) had
parents who did not graduate from high school; (5) lived with unemployed parents; (6) were homeless;
(7) were parents themselves or pregnant; (8) lived under the threat of violence at home or school; (9) had
been retained in grade; (10) scored more than a year below grade level on standardized tests; or (11) had
otherwise been determined to be in need of remedial education. Complaint at 3-4, Bradford v. Md. State
Bd. of Educ., No. 94340058 (Md. Cir. Ct., filed Dec. 6, 1994) [hereinafter ACLU Complaint].
36. Id. at 8.
37. In addition, Mayor Kurt Schmoke faced pressure not to embarrass Governor Parris Glendening,
a fellow Democrat who narrowly won election in 1994 by less than a 6000-vote margin. See Peter Maass
& Charles Babington, Ecker Considers Governor's Race, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1996, at M6
(describing the political ramifications of subsequent Glendening-Schmoke split).
38. Goering Interview, supra note 27.
39. ACLU Complaint, supra note 35, at 2.
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Program (MSPAP), a series of tests administered annually to third-, fifth-, and
eighth-graders. The tests measured higher-order skills in six subject areas. The
tests were designed to assess the effectiveness of schools rather than the skills
of individual students.40 State law authorized the State Board of Education to
take over and "reconstitute" individual schools that consistently failed to make
progress. Since the debut of the MSPAP in 1991, Baltimore had always scored
lower than any other jurisdiction in the state, and forty of the forty-two schools
declared reconstitution-eligible in the first three years of the program were
located in the City.
41
Reliance on MSPAP scores to prove inadequacy placed the ACLU on the
42
cutting edge of a national trend. As adequacy theories grew in popularity in
the mid 1990s, litigants and courts struggled to develop manageable adequacy
standards. Despite the willingness of some courts to articulate tests for
adequacy, others proved reluctant to substitute their own judgments about the
purposes of public education for those of the legislature.43 The rising popularity
of statewide standards in the mid 1990s helped bridge the gap. William Dietz
has argued that plaintiffs will be most successful when they can appeal to
"existing standards" of adequacy.44 Standards-based reform programs provide
the most obvious and accessible sources of existing standards. Plaintiffs in the
early stages of a lawsuit can look to the failure to meet these standards in order
to secure relief while reserving judgment on whether the education clause
requires the state to provide an even higher quality system of education. Beth
McCallum, pro bono counsel assisting the ACLU, said the availability of
MSPAP scores was "tremendously important" for the Bradford plaintiffs.45
Evidence of educational failure in the Baltimore schools existed in
40. Maryland abandoned the MSPAP in 2002, because the failure to provide individual scores did
not comply with the mandates of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. Mike Bowler, Maryland School
Test Is Dropped, BALT. SuN, Apr. 25, 2002, at IA.
41. Mike Bowler, Putting Pupils to the Test in 2004, BALT. SUN, June 23, 1996, at 2C.
42. James Liebman was one of the first scholars to identify the potential use of state standards in
school finance litigation. See James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties: Political
Reconstruction, Liberal Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reform, 76 VA. L. REv. 349,
413-18 (1990); see also Michael Heise, The Courts vs. Educational Standards, 120 PUB. INT. 55, 55
(1995) ("[S]tandards will serve as a catalyst for the next generation of educational litigation.").
43. Compare Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989), with
Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 408 (Fla. 1996)
("[A]ppellants have failed to demonstrate in their allegations, or in their arguments on appeal, an
appropriate standard for determining 'adequacy' that would not present a substantial risk of judicial
intrusion into the powers and responsibilities assigned to the legislature."), and Marrero v.
Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 110, 113-14 (Pa. 1999) ("[Tlhis court is likewise unable to judicially define
what constitutes an 'adequate' education or what funds are 'adequate' to support such a program. These
are matters which are exclusively within the purview of the General Assembly's powers, and they are
not subject to intervention by the judicial branch of our government." (quoting Tabales ex rel. Marrero
v. Commonwealth, 709 A.2d 956, 965-66 (Commw. Ct. Pa. 1998)).
44. William Dietz, Note, Manageable Adequacy Standards, 74 WASH U. L.Q. 1193, 1212 (1996).
45. Telephone Interview with Beth McCallum, Partner, Howrey, Simon, Arnold & White, and pro
bono counsel for the Bradford plaintiffs (Feb. 12, 2003) [hereinafter McCallum Interview].
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abundance. Baltimore had by far the lowest MSPAP scores in the state. The
highest percentage of Baltimore schoolchildren receiving a satisfactory MSPAP
score in any subject area during the 1992 administration of the test was 20.5%
for fifth-grade math.4 6 The average in math for the rest of the state was
46.5%. 47 The average passing rate for students in Baltimore across the four
subject areas for which the ACLU had 1992 data at the time of filing was
10.1%, less than one-third of the state average. 48 Not only had Baltimore
students failed to pass, but 60.5% had scored at the lowest possible level on the
tests.49 The data for older students was no more encouraging. The annual
dropout rate in Baltimore hovered around seventeen percent. Of the students
who remained in high school, 23.3% of eleventh-graders had not passed all four
functional tests in 1994, even though the state designed the tests to measure
eighth-grade skills.50 Approximately thirty percent of students who did
graduate failed to complete the minimum course requirements for admission to
the University of Maryland system.
51
The ACLU complaint also highlighted serious resource deficiencies in
Baltimore. Although the City spent more per pupil than nine other districts in
the state, its unique concentration of special needs (as well as some
questionable management decisions) left it spending less on instructional
52expenses than any other jurisdiction. The City paid its teachers between
$3000 and $8500 less per year than teachers in neighboring school districts. 53 It
received fewer applications per position than any other system in the state, and
persistently failed to fill up to ten percent of its teaching vacancies. 54 Over
twenty percent of school buildings were rated as being in "poor" condition.
Baltimore spent less money on library books than any other district and ranked
near the bottom in spending on classroom materials and supplies.
56
The ACLU complaint did not seek a specific remedy. Instead, it asked the
court to declare that Maryland had an obligation to provide every child with an
adequate education, and that the State had failed to meets its obligation. It then
asked the court to order the State to sit down with the ACLU and the City to
develop a remedy.
46. ACLU Complaint, supra note 35, at 14.
47. Id.
48. Seeid. at 14-15.
49. See id. at 15. The ACLU did not provide data for fifth grade social studies.
50. See id. at 20.
51. Id. at 24.
52. Baltimore spent $2437 per student on current instructional expenses in 1992-93. The statewide
average was $2926. Id. at 36.
53. Id. at 27.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 30.
56. Id. at 29.
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D. The City of Baltimore Complaint
Originally, Baltimore City intended to file its own complaint at the same
time as the ALCU, but the City delayed filing in the hope of reaching a political
settlement with newly-elected Governor Parris Glendening. It engaged in
sporadic negotiations with the State for nine months but emerged empty-
handed. Former Mayor Kurt Schmoke attributed the failure to reach a political
solution in part to the fragmented nature of funding for urban education. He
explained that Baltimore's reliance on local, state, and federal funding in
roughly equal proportions forced the City to respond to "multiple
constituencies, each of which had its own power base over our budget."57 The
presence of so many players with veto rights prevented Baltimore from making
the political concessions required to strike a deal with the State.
Once it became clear that additional education aid would not be
forthcoming, the City filed its own lawsuit, Mayor v. Maryland, in Baltimore
Circuit Court on September 15, 1995. 8 Baltimore also sued under an adequacy
theory, and its complaint followed the general structure of the ACLU's but
placed more emphasis on monetary relief. Baltimore alleged that the State had
set the level of its foundation grants too low for property-poor districts like the
City to provide an adequate education to their students. It requested an order
requiring the state to assess the actual needs of City students and fund the
system accordingly.
59
E. The State Response and the Combination of the Lawsuits
After Baltimore filed its complaint, the legal battle over the school finance
system began in earnest. The State answered the complaint on October 20,
1995 by going on the offensive. It counter-sued the City of Baltimore and
impleaded Baltimore into the Bradford case as a defendant. Although this move
technically placed Baltimore and the ACLU on opposite sides of the Bradford
case, the combined litigation proceeded as if Bradford and Mayor v. Maryland
were a single case with both the ACLU and City functioning as plaintiffs.
The State alleged that pervasive mismanagement in Baltimore, rather than a
lack of resources, was responsible for the deficiencies of the City school
system. 60 Although the State did not concede inadequacy, it devoted most of its
answer to supporting its allegations of mismanagement. The State focused in
57. Telephone Interview with Kurt Schmoke, former Mayor of Baltimore (Feb. 13, 2003)
[hereinafter Schmoke Interview].
58. Not all states allow municipalities to sue the state in this fashion. See, e.g., City of New York v.
New York, 655 N.E.2d 649, 651 (N.Y. 1995).
59. Complaint at 33-34, Mayor v. Maryland, No. 95-258055 (Md. Cir. Ct., filed Sept. 15, 1995).
60. Kate Shatzkin & Mike Bowler, Md. Fires a Salvo in School Dispute, BALT. SUN, Oct. 21, 1995,
at IA.
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particular on the results of a 1992 management study, and it accused Baltimore
of failing to implement any of the management reforms recommended in the
report. 61 The State also noted that Baltimore had failed to spend $11.9 million
in federal and state funds for which it was already eligible. 62 The state asked
the Circuit Court to order a "substantial, immediate restructuring" of the
Baltimore school system.
63
As a legal strategy, the decision to focus on mismanagement within
Baltimore accomplished little for the defendants. The education clause of the
Maryland Constitution places the duty of providing a "thorough and efficient"
education on the State. A focus on mismanagement might have changed the
nature of the remedy required, but it could not rebut the allegation that the state
had failed to meet its constitutional duty in the first place. The State's response
proved especially ineffective as a legal theory because of the unique dynamic
created by the participation of two plaintiffs in the case. Baltimore was not only
unwilling to acknowledge mismanagement, but wanted to avoid the
embarrassment of having its administrative failures exposed in public. The
ACLU had no such qualms. The independence the ACLU gained by
representing a class of parents and children rather than the school system
allowed it to levy criticism at both sides in the debate. Susan Goering
explained:
[W]hen the City intervened in the suit, there was inevitably fingerpointing back and
forth about who was at fault for the dismal outcomes. We were able to say: "It's not
our problem.... If the State doesn't like what the City is doing, it has the authority
to make the City do something different. 
6 4
The ACLU had staked out the same position in its complaint when it stated:
"To the extent that misuse of available funds or other mismanagement, at any
level of government, contributes to the failure of BCPS to provide an adequate
education to plaintiff schoolchildren, the State is legally responsible for those
failures as well.
65
Even Nancy Grasmick, the State Superintendent of Schools and one of the
defendants in the combined case, conceded the strength of the ACLU position.
During a deposition, she responded "yes" when asked whether "public
education is basically a function and responsibility of the state.' ' 6 More




64. Goering Interview, supra note 27. Louis Bograd, an attorney with the national ACLU working
on the Bradford case, echoed this sentiment. See Telephone Interview with Louis Bograd, ACLU (Jan.
5, 1999) [hereinafter Bograd Interview] ("Whether it is money or management... the state is the
responsible legal authority.").
65. ACLU Complaint, supra note 35, at 37.
66. Deposition of Nancy Grasmick at 201, Bradford v. Md. State Bd. of Educ., Nos. 94-340058 &
95-258055 (Md. Cir. Ct., deposition taken Feb. 15, 1996).
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the plaintiffs partial summary judgment on October 16, 1996, holding that the
education clause imposed an affirmative duty on the state to provide "an
education that is adequate when measured by contemporary education
standards." 67 He also found no genuine material factual dispute over whether
students in Baltimore were receiving an adequate education; they were not.
68
Judge Kaplan accordingly instructed the parties to focus their efforts at trial on
the disputed issues that remained: the cause of the inadequacy and the
appropriate remedy.
Even though the decision to focus on mismanagement produced limited
success as a legal strategy beyond influencing the contours of the remedy, it
functioned quite effectively as a political strategy. It signaled that the State
cared about the Baltimore schools and was not simply being obstructionist by
denying its constitutional duty altogether. Indeed, it allowed the state to portray
itself as acting in the best interest of the school children in Baltimore by
insisting that any infusion of resources be well spent. The focus on
mismanagement also maintained the State's credibility by dodging the uphill
struggle that would have been required to demonstrate the adequacy of the
Baltimore schools. At the same time, the emphasis on mismanagement put
Baltimore on the defensive. It was personally and politically embarrassing for
Mayor Kurt Schmoke. It also called into question the relationship between
resources and educational achievement, thereby forcing Baltimore to expend its
energy arguing this technical point rather than presenting more emotionally
compelling evidence about its plight.
F. The Road to Settlement
As the parties braced themselves for trial and continued to squabble in the
public arena, the Bradford case took an unusual turn. Judge Kaplan met with
Federal District Court Judge Marvin Garbis to discuss the similarities between
the Bradford case and a decade-old special education case overseen by Judge
Garbis called Vaughn G. v. Amprey.69 They decided that both cases would
function better if combined, since the Bradford class of at-risk students
overlapped substantially with the special education class in the federal case.
Mayor Schmoke agreed, noting that special education reform could not proceed
without finance reform.7 °
The parties never put the joint federal-state trial arrangement to the test,
67. Bradford v. Md. State Bd. of Educ., Nos. 94-340058 & 95-258055, slip op. at I (Md. Cir. Ct.
Oct. 18, 1996) (Order in Response to the Bradford Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment).
68. Id. at 2.
69. The history of the Vaughn G. litigation is recounted in Vaughn G. v. Amprey, No. 96-1507,
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 16959 (4th Cir. July 8, 1997).
70. Schmoke Interview, supra note 57 ("It was so clear that ultimately we needed more resources in
the schools if we were going to be able to satisfy the requirements coming out of Vaughn G.").
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however, because they were able to reach a settlement in both the school
finance and special education cases before trial. Although Baltimore had filed
suit after nine months of failed negotiations, State Schools Superintendent
Nancy Grasmick approached Mayor Schmoke after the initial flurry of
pleadings to broach the subject of a settlement once again.7 1 These discussions
laid the groundwork for a plan in which Baltimore would relinquish some
control over its schools in exchange for an infusion of new money from the
state. The parties remained far apart, however, on the details of the plan. The
General Assembly responded during the 1996 legislative session with an
attempt to pressure the City to settle. Lawmakers adopted a carrot-and-stick
approach. The carrot included an additional $10 million for the worst-
performing schools in the City and $2 million to raise teacher salaries. The
stick involved withholding $12 million in general school aid already
appropriated for Baltimore. Lawmakers made access to both pots of money,
$24 million in total, contingent on Baltimore's agreement to restructure its
school system and drop its lawsuit.72 Interestingly, legislators appeared to
overlook the role of the ACLU in the lawsuit, and again the independence the
ACLU gained from representing a class of parents and students came into play.
Stuart Comstock-Gay, Executive Director of the ACLU of Maryland at the
time, announced that the ACLU would not drop its lawsuit simply to secure
release of the withheld $24 million, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the
withheld money as a negotiating tool in the hands of the state.73
Negotiations between the City and State dragged into the summer. The
parties made an apparent breakthrough in July when the Governor and Mayor
reached a "conceptual agreement" to restructure the City School Board, funnel
$150 million in new funding to the City over five years, and delay Baltimore's
lawsuit for one year.74 But the handshake agreement collapsed shortly
afterwards amid mutual recriminations, creating a deep political rift between
the Mayor and Governor that culminated in Schmoke's decision to endorse
Glendening's opponent in the 1998 Democratic primary.
The prospect of a settlement seemed dead after the public meltdown of the
handshake agreement, and the parties braced for their November 6 trial date.
Several weeks before trial, however, Judge Kaplan reinitiated settlement
negotiations. He called all the parties together and asked them to prepare
confidential memos outlining their settlement demands and potential areas of
71. Jean Thompson & JoAnna Daemmrich, State Seeks Grip on City Schools, BALT. SUN, Jan. 16,
1996, at IA.
72. Jean Thompson, Legislators Attach Strings to More City School Funds, BALT. SUN, Apr. 3,
1996, at 3B.
73. Thomas W. Waldron & Peter Jensen, City School Aid Freeze Is Likely, BALT. SUN, Apr. 2,
1996, at IA.
74. Jean Thompson & Thomas W. Waldron, Standoff Over City Schools Eases, BALT. SUN, July
27, 1996, at IA.
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compromise. He then slowly went to work on the litigants, warning them that a
trial would poison the atmosphere for future education reform in Baltimore.
Sensing progress, Judge Kaplan and Judge Garbis postponed the trial on the
night before it was set to begin to give the parties one final chance to reach an
agreement. Three weeks of intensive, round-the-clock negotiations followed as
the lawyers grappled with the complexity of crafting a four-way settlement.
Key to the success of the negotiations was the extensive involvement of the
politicians responsible for implementing the settlement that emerged. Attorneys
for the state consulted regularly with the Governor, his chief of staff, his budget
secretary, the State Secretary of Education, the President of the State Board of
Education, and the chairs of the Senate Budget and Taxation Committee and
the House Appropriations Committee.
Noticeably absent from the negotiations were representatives from
Montgomery County, Maryland's wealthiest subdivision and the one most
opposed to providing additional aid for Baltimore. Montgomery County had
played a crucial role in Hornbeck, joining the case as a third-party defendant
and spending $1.3 million defending the constitutionality of the school finance
system. 75 It attempted to intervene once again in the Bradford case under the
theory that its taxpayers would disproportionately bear the cost of a plaintiff
victory. Judge Kaplan rejected the request and ruled that "Montgomery County
is not entitled as a matter of right to intervene in this litigation, which is a
discrete case involving the adequacy of the education of Baltimore City
schoolchildren. 76 His decision rested on the distinction between the direct
impact of an equity case on the statewide funding formula and the indirect
impact of an adequacy case on Montgomery County. A narrowly divided Court
of Appeals upheld the decision, reasoning that a plaintiff victory would "not
automatically or necessarily result in any of Maryland's current public school
funding resources being diverted from their current uses to provide additional
funding for the City's public schools."
77
The parties agreed that the exclusion of Montgomery County from the
negotiations greatly enhanced their ability to reach a settlement. "It would have
been a whole lot more difficult to negotiate a settlement if Montgomery County
had been at the table," said Louis Bograd, the lead negotiator for the ACLU.78
75. Richard Tapscott, Sparks Fly Over Schmoke's School Aid Fight, WASH. POST, May 26, 1992, at
BI.
76. Reporter's Official Transcript at 33, Bradford v. Md. State Bd. of Educ., Nos. 94-340058 & 95-
258055 (Md. Cir. Ct., proceedings of Apr. 4, 1996).
77. Montgomery County v. Bradford, 691 A.2d 1281, 1292 (Md. 1997). Other states have proved
more tolerant of interveners in their school finance cases. See, e.g., Pinto v. Ala. Coalition for Equity,
662 So. 2d 894 (Ala. 1995). The specific legal theory advanced by Montgomery County, however,
seems unlikely to gain much traction elsewhere since allowing a county to intervene on the basis of its
disproportionate contribution to the state's coffers does not readily lend itself to any limiting principle
that would prevent the county from claiming intervention rights in all cases against the state.
78. Bograd Interview, supra note 64.
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An attorney for the State Board of Education concurred, calling the exclusion
"essential" and noting that "if Montgomery County were in the case, the whole
focus would have shifted.,
79
G. The Consent Decree
The parties reached an agreement in principle to settle the case on
November 11, 1996, just five days after the trial was slated to begin. They then
continued negotiating for two more weeks in order to produce a written
document that all could endorse. The final consent decree was signed on
November 26. It began by accepting the existence of the State's duty to provide
"all students in Maryland's public schools with an education that is adequate
when measured by contemporary educational standards," and acknowledging
the failure to provide students in Baltimore with an adequate education." The
remainder of the consent decree was divided into three sections.
The first section created a new governance and management structure for
the City schools. It replaced the existing board, appointed entirely by the
Mayor, with a new board selected jointly by the Mayor and Governor from a
list of candidates submitted by the State Board of Education. 81 The agreement
further specified the composition of the new ten-person board, requiring it to
include at least four members with substantial experience in the administration
of large business or non-profit entities, three members with educational
expertise, at least one parent of a currently enrolled student, at least one
member with special education experience, and one non-voting student
member. 82 The consent decree replaced the existing position of superintendent
with a triumvirate of officials-a Chief Executive Officer, a Chief Financial
Officer, and a Chief Academic Officer-all of whom reported to the board. It
also established a fourteen-member Parent and Community Advisory Board.
The Bradford plaintiffs were entitled to appoint two members of the Advisory
Board, and the plaintiffs in the federal special education case were entitled to
appoint three.83 The decree gave the CEO the power to appoint the remaining
nine members with board approval: three from a list submitted by the Baltimore
Council of PTAs, two from area-based parent networks, two from a list
compiled by the Title I liaisons, and the final two from other parent or
84community groups.
79. Telephone interview with an official in the Maryland Attorney General's Office speaking on
condition of anonymity (Jan 31, 2003) [hereinafter Maryland Attorney General's Office Interview].
80. Consent Decree at 2, Bradford v. Md. State Bd. of Educ., Nos. 94-340058 & 95-258055 (Md.
Cir. Ct., entered Nov. 26, 1996) [hereinafter Consent Decree].
81. Id. at 5.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 7.
84. Id. at 8.
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The consent decree required the new board to adopt a Master Plan by
March 1, 1998 detailing its strategy for improving academic achievement and
management of the system. Thereafter the board was obligated to issue annual
public reports analyzing its progress under the Master Plan. The consent decree
also included a controversial provision canceling all collective bargaining
agreements on June 30, 1997, so that the new board could negotiate with its
unions on a clean slate.
The second section of the consent decree promised additional funding for
the Baltimore schools. The State agreed to provide $230 million in new
operating aid over five years with a payment of $30 million in the first year and
$50 million in each subsequent year.85 It also promised $24 million in other aid,
primarily school construction funding.86 The State agreed that the new money
would not supplant any existing sources of funding. 87 To further protect itself
against the loss of general education aid, Baltimore insisted that the State cap
the amount of funding it would lose under the enrollment-driven formula as the
number of students in its schools declined. As a compromise, the parties
endorsed a table of projected enrollment figures for the City over the five-year
period of the consent decree. The table predicted that Baltimore would lose
over 12,000 students. The consent decree granted the State flexibility to reduce
funding based on the projected figures but prevented it from cutting aid any
further if actual enrollment dipped below the projections.
The funding section of the consent decree also contained a provision
allowing the plaintiffs to request more money beginning in 1999. The State
committed to use "best efforts to satisfy any such request, subject to the
availability of funds."88 The decree provided that the plaintiffs could return to
court under an expedited hearing schedule and receive a hearing on their
request within fifteen days if the State failed to appropriate the money. Of all
the provisions in the consent decree, the plaintiffs' ability to request more
funding and challenge any denial in court would prove the most divisive since
it set the parties on a collision course for the future.
89
The third and final section of the consent decree addressed the grievances
raised in the federal special education case. It dissolved the dual management
85. Id. at 15.
86. See id. at 14-15.
87. Id. at 13-14. Controversy over remedial funding supplanting existing funding flared up in 1998
and led former School Board Chairman Philip Farfel, one of the original plaintiffs in the Mayor v.
Maryland case, back to court. See Request for Declaratory Judgment that the State is Supplanting Funds
in Violation of the November 26, 1996 Consent Decree, Mayor v. Maryland, No. 95-258055 (Md. Cir.
Ct., filed Oct. 6, 1998). Judge Kaplan dismissed the case on standing grounds. See Bradford v. Md. State
Bd. of Educ., Nos. 94-340058 & 95-258055 (Md. Cir. Ct. Apr. 10, 2001) (Order in Response to Request
for Declaratory Judgment that the State is Supplanting Funds in Violation of the November 26, 1996
Consent Decree).
88. Consent Decree, supra note 80, at 16.
89. See infra discussion accompanying notes 140-144.
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structure created by prior court orders and returned control over special
education to the new Board of School Commissioners and CEO, subject to a
number of conditions and ongoing monitoring requirements.
H. The Advantages of Settling
The decision to settle the Bradford case offered the plaintiffs a number of
advantages. Like any settlement, it hedged against the uncertainty of an
unfavorable court ruling. The initial trial did not appear to be a cause for
concern, since Judge Kaplan's partial summary judgment order had already
granted the plaintiffs a victory on the two most important aspects of their
case-the existence of a constitutional duty to provide an adequate education
and a violation of that duty. The plaintiffs could not be certain, though, how
they would fare on appeal where they could expect a colder reception than they
had received before the Circuit Court of Baltimore City. Indeed, when the
question whether Montgomery County should be allowed to intervene in the
Bradford case reached the Court of Appeals, the dissenters expressed
considerable hostility toward the plaintiffs' legal theory and request for relief.
Judge Eldridge joined by Judge Raker invoked separation of powers concerns
to question the ability of a court to order the legislature to appropriate
additional money or restructure the Baltimore school system.90 The dissenters
characterized the terms of the consent decree as an "unprecedented excursion
beyond the outer limits of judicial authority." 9' The majority, in contrast, took
no position on the merits of the underlying legal issues apart from Montgomery
County's attempt to intervene.92 Had Judges Eldridge and Raker been able to
convince just two other judges to join them on a direct appeal of the Bradford
case, the plaintiffs would have lost on appeal had they chosen not to settle.
More daunting to the plaintiffs than the uncertainty of prevailing on appeal
was the certainty that pursuing their case through the courts would substantially
delay the implementation of a remedy. 93 On the whole, they had confidence in
their legal theory. Beth McCallum described the "evidence of inadequacy" as
"truly undisputed and truly horrific." 94 In fact, the plaintiffs were loathe to
delay the remedy precisely because they were so confident that students in
Baltimore were not receiving an adequate education.
95
90. See Montgomery County v. Bradford, 691 A.2d 1281, 1294 (Md. 1997) (Eldridge, J.,
dissenting).
91. Id. at 1295.
92. See id. (majority opinion) ("The cases before us involved nothing more than Montgomery
County's motion to intervene and we do not therefore consider the merits of the underlying cases.").
93. Schmoke Interview, supra note 57 ("I was really hesitant about lawsuits because they just drag
on for so long.").
94. McCallum Interview, supra note 45.
95. Former Senator Barbara Hoffman framed the issue of delay vividly, explaining that every five-
year interval, such as the five years in which the ACLU and Baltimore postponed filing suit while
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The settlement saved the plaintiffs the expense of conducting a full trial and
arguing years of appeals, but to achieve the settlement, the plaintiffs had to
spend considerable amounts of money preparing for trial. The parties took over
100 depositions.96 They employed expert witnesses. Baltimore alone paid its
lead attorney over $1.6 million before entering the month-long, round-the-clock
negotiations that produced the settlement.97 The firm of Howrey Simon spent
over $2 million in actual costs and attorney time between the initial round of
litigation and the return to court in 2000 assisting the ACLU on a pro bono
basis. 98 Only by demonstrating their capability to sustain a legal challenge were
the Bradford plaintiffs able to create the credible threat of a court victory
needed to force the state to the bargaining table.
Finally, settling the case helped to foster a cooperative atmosphere that
benefited the plaintiffs when the remedy went before the legislature. Litigation
can strain long-standing relationships and harden bargaining positions for the
future. 99 The courtroom forces parties to interact as adversaries. It devalues
nuance and the shades of gray necessary for maintaining long-term partnerships
in favor of clear claims of entitlement. The settlement process, in contrast,
enabled the Bradford plaintiffs to forge a partnership with the defendants.
Together, they emerged from negotiations as allies committed to passing a
common plan. The political leaders who endorsed the settlement then went
back to the General Assembly and worked as insiders to shepherd the remedy
through the legislature rather than as adversaries.
Despite its prevalence in other areas of law, settlement has proven the
exception rather than the rule in school finance litigation. 00 Three factors
contributed to the ability of the parties in the Bradford case to reach an
amicable settlement. First, the defendants in the case sympathized with the
plight of the Baltimore schools. State Superintendent Nancy Grasmick had
been an outspoken advocate for the children of Baltimore and genuinely
wanted her legacy to include reform of the city schools. Representatives from
Baltimore chaired the two most important appropriations committees in
Annapolis. Governor Glendening, himself a former professor, believed in the
importance of education and was politically indebted to the city for his narrow,
seeking a political solution, represented the entire elementary school career of a student. Telephone
Interview with Barbara Hoffman, former chair of the Maryland Senate Budget and Taxation Committee
(Feb. 13, 2003) [hereinafter Hoffman Interview].
96. Jean Thompson, Questions and Answers on School Reform, BALT. SUN, Aug. 4, 1996, at 23A.
97. Jean Thompson, Legal Bills Hit $5 Million in Schools Suit, BALT. SUN, Dec. 8, 1996, at lB.
98. Goering Interview, supra note 27.
99. Id. ("When you go to court it can be very polarizing.... it becomes more difficult for the state
officials to say, 'We'll do our part."').
100. But see Lauren A. Wetzler, Buying Equality: How School Finance Reform and Desegregation
Came to Compete in Connecticut, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 481, 505 (2004); Anne O'Connor, NAACP
School Suit is Settled; Group, State Agree on Offering More Options for City Students, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis, MN), Mar. 14, 2000, at IA.
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5000-vote margin of victory in the 1994 election. Second, representatives from
all three branches of government participated actively in settlement
negotiations, and Judge Kaplan encouraged lawyers for the state to consult
frequently with state officials to ensure that their concessions did not move too
far beyond what the political leaders of the state were willing to endorse. This
inclusive approach paid enormous political dividends, since the Governor and
key lawmakers found themselves in the position of enacting a plan they had
agreed to rather than reluctantly responding to a court order. Third, and most
importantly, the plaintiffs were politically astute and patient. They recognized
that lawmakers would not appropriate additional money for Baltimore without
management reforms. Mayor Schmoke made the difficult decision to relinquish
considerable control over the schools in order to secure a financial remedy. The
plaintiffs also moderated their financial demands to make the plan more
palatable to lawmakers. Maryland faced a projected deficit of $200 million in
the 1997-98 fiscal year. The plaintiffs strategically decided to accept smaller
short-term funding infusions in exchange for the provision in the consent
decree allowing them to return to court in several years to request additional
funding.
The willingness of the Bradford plaintiffs to time the business cycle in their
pursuit of education funding holds lessons for other states. Melissa Carr and
Susan Fuhrman have noted that school finance reform proves significantly
more difficult during tight fiscal times because lawmakers seeking to help poor
districts face an unsavory choice between raising taxes and redistributing
revenue.101 In fact, Furman found as an empirical matter that "periods of
legislative activity in the sphere of school finance have usually coincided with
strong state economies."' 0 2 The connection makes sense. Surpluses allow
lawmakers to provide infusions of money for poor districts without leveling-
down or otherwise threatening wealthier districts. The Bradford plaintiffs
recognized this fact and correctly predicted in 1997 that Maryland would soon
be experiencing substantial surpluses. Susan Goering said:
In 1997, the state was in a recession, and they said that it was the best they could
do. We accepted that but [knew] red ink might not be flowing later. We thought
strategically that if the City could use its money wisely and well for a couple years
that at some point when the situation was better fiscally for the state then we could
ask for more money.103
Although delaying a full remedy during difficult economic times can harm the
students continuing to receive an inadequate education in the interim, it may, as
a pragmatic move, prove necessary in some situations to avoid the even longer
101. See Melissa C. Carr & Susan H. Fuhrnan, The Politics of School Finance in the 1990s, in
EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE 136, 150 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999).
102. Id. at 140 (citing Susan H. Fuhrman, Legislatures and Education Policy, in THE GOVERNANCE
OF CURRICULUM 30, 31 (R.F. Elmore & Susan H. Fuhrman eds., 1994)).
103. Goering Interview, supra note 27.
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delays that accompany a stand-off between the courts and the legislature after
lawmakers reject a full remedy as fiscally infeasible.
III. THE REMEDY
A. Passage of Senate Bill 795
The General Assembly endorsed the Bradford consent decree at the end of
the 1997 legislative session,'0 4 but the result was far from preordained. In fact,
Senate President Mike Miller publicly predicted the defeat of the remedy on the
eve of the legislative session.'0 5 Lawmakers from Prince George's County, the
only other majority-black jurisdiction in the state and a traditional ally of
Baltimore in the struggle for school funding, followed a few weeks later with
an announcement that they would not support an infusion of money for
Baltimore unless their county received a comparable package.' 0 6 Baltimore's
political strength had been waning in the General Assembly for years. As
discussed, it had experienced rapid population loss in the 1990s, and legislators
knew that Baltimore would lose several seats in the General Assembly after the
2000 census.' 0 7 Even worse, the seats were expected to go to Montgomery
County, the most vocal opponent of more increasing aid to Baltimore. As the
legislative session opened, Montgomery County still smarted from Judge
Kaplan's denial of its petition to intervene in the litigation and was appealing
its exclusion to the Maryland Court of Appeals.
In this difficult political climate, five factors accounted for the ultimate
passage of the Bradford remedy. First, the decision to sue under an adequacy
theory rather than an equity theory made the remedy less threatening to
suburban counties in Maryland. Although adequacy suits involve the
redistribution of resources through the tax system, the redistribution is indirect
and does not impact schools in neighboring jurisdictions in as politically visible
ways as equity suits. The ACLU had emphasized from the moment it filed suit
that it did not want to take resources away from schools outside of Baltimore to
fund the remedy. The first paragraph of the ACLU complaint stated, "Nor do
the claims presented herein seek to reduce or reallocate educational resources
currently provided to any other school district in Maryland. Rather, this case is
104. An Act Concerning Primary and Secondary Education-New Baltimore City Board of School
Commissioners, 1997 MD. LAWS 105. The House of Delegates voted 78-61 to approve Senate Bill 795
on April 5, 1997. See Thomas W. Waldron & William F. Zorzi, Jr., House Passes Measure on City
Schools, BALT. SUN., Apr. 6, 1997, at IA. The Maryland Senate passed Senate Bill 795 by a vote of 33-
13 on April 7, 1997. See Thomas W. Waldron, Assembly Ends with a Flurry, BALT. SUN., Apr. 8, 1997,
at IA.
105. C. Fraser Smith, Miller Predicts Demise ofSchool Aid, BALT. SUN, Jan. 8, 1997, at IA.
106. Terry M. Neal, Pr. George's Wants a State Deal Like Baltimore 's - or Else, WASH. POST, Jan.
25, 1997, at C1.
107. The prediction proved correct. See Thomas W. Waldron & Jeff Baker, A Shrinking Baltimore
Is Losing Its Political Grip, BALT. SUN, Mar. 20, 2001, at IA.
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brought solely to ensure that all schoolchildren in Baltimore City have access to
a constitutionally adequate public education."' 0 8 By avoiding the specter of
leveling-down, the ACLU reassured lawmakers that they could vote for the
Bradford remedy without hurting their own districts. As Peter Enrich put it in
his article about the switch from equity to adequacy, adequacy suits, unlike
equity suits, do not ask politically powerful constituencies "to sacrifice their
own children's educations for the sake of a societal norm."'
0 9
Second, linking the infusion of education aid to management reform
reassured lawmakers that Baltimore was less likely to waste the new money.
The City-State partnership required the State Board of Education to monitor the
way in which Baltimore spent the money and to hold the Board of School
Commissioners accountable for meeting the reform targets in its Master Plan.
Even some lawmakers who remained unconvinced of the need for additional
funding viewed it in pragmatic terms as the price of securing a new
management structure in the City. 
1 0
Third, the threat of returning to court made the General Assembly wary of
voting against the Bradford remedy. The prospect of a court ordering even
larger spending increases sent ripples of fear through Annapolis. Lawmakers
also worried that a judicial remedy would not include the extensive
management reforms demanded by the state in settlement negotiations. The
consent decree played upon this fear of a court-ordered remedy. It scheduled
the lawsuit to resume on May 12, 1997, a month after the end of the legislative
session, if the General Assembly did not enact its provisions into law.'11
Former Senator Barbara Hoffman, who repeatedly warned her colleagues that
inaction would return the case to court, said, "It was very clear to everybody
that this was not an idle threat."' 1 2 The threat of returning to court gained even
greater saliency in the closing days of the legislative session when the Ohio
Supreme Court struck down Ohio's school funding system on adequacy
grounds. 113 According to Delegate Michael Gordon, the Ohio decision
reminded lawmakers what could happen in Maryland if they failed to act and
allowed the Bradford case to return to court.'1 14
Fourth, the consent decree served an important agenda-setting function.
Courts often decline on separation of powers grounds to order specific
remedies in school finance cases. In fact, they sometimes provide legislators
108. ACLU Complaint, supra note 35, at 1.
109. Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND.
L. REv. 101, 169(1995).
110. Telephone Interview with Del. Michael Gordon, Maryland House of Delegates (Dec. 31,
1998) [hereinafter Gordon Interview].
11. Consent Decree, supra note 80, at 4.
112. Hoffman Interview, supra note 95.
113. DeRolph v. Ohio, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997), was decided on March 24, 1997.
114. Gordon Interview, supra note 110.
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with confusing and even contradictory guidance, leaving them to guess what
steps they must take to bring the school funding system into compliance with
the dictates of the state constitution. 115 This vagueness can lead to considerable
frustration and additional rounds of litigation as courts continually strike down
remedial legislation without providing a clear blueprint for how to design a
constitutional system."16 The consent decree in the Bradford case avoided these
problems by presenting lawmakers with a detailed plan. The decree even
included the text of a proposed bill implementing its terms. The General
Assembly enjoyed little leeway to alter the bill, since changes affecting the
substantive rights of any party required the written permission of that party or
the approval of the court.' 7 The consent decree consequently forced lawmakers
to vote up or down on the proposal negotiated by the parties while depriving
opponents of the opportunity to weaken it with amendments or through
parliamentary maneuvering.
Fifth, the decision to broaden the Bradford remedy to include additional
funding for at-risk students outside of Baltimore considerably enhanced its
popularity in the General Assembly. From the moment the consent decree was
signed, politicians from around Maryland began complaining about the
perceived unfairness of helping only Baltimore when every county in the state
educated at-risk children. Even Montgomery County had felt the pinch after
two decades of shifting demographics. One in five students in the Montgomery
County school system qualified for free or reduced-price lunch," 8 and the
county educated over half of all English for Speakers of Other Languages
(ESOL) students in the state. 119 To address such needs, representatives from
Maryland's six largest counties floated a plan to link the $254 million aid
package for Baltimore City with $325 million for the rest of the state over five
years. 12 Legislative leaders balked at the price tag of the proposal, but
eventually reached a deal with most of the suburban counties to include an
115. Compare Brigham v. Vermont, 692 A.2d 384, 397 (1997) ("We find no authority for the
proposition that discrimination in the distribution of a constitutionally mandated right such as education
may be excused merely because a 'minimal' level of opportunity is provided to all."), with id. ("Equal
opportunity does not necessarily require precisely equal per-capita expenditures, nor does it necessarily
prohibit cities and towns from spending more on education if they choose ... ").
116. See, e.g., Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.
(Edgewood 111), 826 S.W.2d 489, 538 (Tex. 1992) (Doggett, J., dissenting) ("A majority of this court
has led the Legislature down the primrose path. Today's unconstitutional legislation is only yesterday's
judicial vision; it is nothing more than the natural response to the majority's previous encouragement of
tax base consolidation. The Legislature, the Governor, and three separate Texas trial judges all followed
accurately the prior judicial instructions; now the majority unjustifiably changes the instructions.").
117. Consent Decree, supra note 80, at 4.
118. Howard Libit, Local Schools Seeing Rise in Urban Woes, BALT. SUN, May 18, 1997, at 1B.
119. Michael Dresser, Montgomery Pupils Speak a World of Languages, BALT. SUN, Mar. 1, 1997,
at lB.
120. Terry M. Neal, Counties'Plan: Money for All Schools in Md., WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 1997, at
BI.
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additional $167 million in Senate Bill 795 for schools outside Baltimore.121
B. The Politics of Race
Race played a puzzling role in the Bradford case. James Ryan has studied
the impact of race on school finance litigation and noted a "discernable pattern
in legislative responses: minority districts that were successful in court faced
protracted legislative battles that were more intense and longer-lasting than
those typically faced by successful white districts." 122 Baltimore represents a
striking counter-example to this general trend. As a predominantly African-
American city, it managed to secure a sizeable remedy within months after
ending its court battle. Race was not irrelevant, but the relatively limited impact
of race on the Bradford case requires explanation.
One answer advanced by critics of the City-State Partnership is that race
did indeed play an enormous role in the litigation, and that its apparent absence
from the debate simply reflected the collapse of African-American political
power in Maryland. They viewed the infusion of money into Baltimore not as a
gesture of concern for black schoolchildren but simply as a buyout in exchange
for depriving African-Americans of control over their own school system. This
perspective bubbled to the surface most notably in the closing days of the 1997
legislative session when a group of African-American leaders wrote an open
letter to the General Assembly. The letter accused state officials of making
Baltimore a "colony of the State" in a gesture of "racist paternalism."'
23
Signatories included a set of prominent black ministers, the CEO of
Baltimore's Afro-American newspaper, and Kweisi Mfume, a former Maryland
congressman and head of the national NAACP. Their view gained additional
adherents after the fact in 2002 when the State intervened in Prince George's
County, the only other majority-minority county in the state, to replace its
school board as well.
124
Despite these accusations, proponents of school finance reform in Maryland
appear genuinely to have succeeded in minimizing the importance of race
compared to other states. The ACLU scrupulously avoided mentioning race in
its pleadings. Susan Goering had come to the organization after working on the
121. David Montgomery et al., Montgomery, Pr. George's Satisfied, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1997,
at Mi.
122. James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 MICH. L. REV. 432, 457-
58 (1999).
123. Letter from Rev. Arnold Howard et al., to the Maryland General Assembly 1 (Apr. 3, 1997),
reprinted in Thomas W. Waldron & William F. Zorzi, Jr., Blacks Denounce Schools Package, BALT.
SUN, Apr. 4, 1997, at IA.
124. Paul Schwartzman, Crisis over Schools Had Been Building, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2002, at BI
("[A]dvocates of change faced vigorous attacks from opponents who equated the abolition of an elected
panel with robbing citizens of their voting rights, an argument that may carry added resonance in a
county that is predominantly black.").
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trial of the famous desegregation case of Missouri v. Jenkins, and she was wary
of complicating the litigation in Maryland. She noted, "For better or worse,
what ends up happening when you introduce race is that it adds a layer of
complexity and political charge that ends up making it harder sometimes to get
the remedy.,
125
Broadening the remedy provided in Senate Bill 795 further mitigated the
impact of race by expanding the class of perceived beneficiaries of the
legislation to include a substantial number of at-risk whites. Such an approach
will not always be successful. Professor Ryan examined polling data from New
Jersey and Texas indicating that white residents tended to perceive school
finance reform as primarily benefiting minorities even when their own districts
received substantial funding boosts.' 2 6 Ryan accordingly concluded that
"incorporating minority districts within a larger group of beneficiaries that
includes white districts may not be sufficient to overcome popular perception
that legislative reform will primarily assist minorities. 127 The experience of
Maryland does not necessarily rebut this conclusion, since the extent to which
the inclusion of $167 million for other counties changed perceptions among the
public at large remains unclear. Broadening the remedy, however, at least
allowed lawmakers who were paying close attention to the distribution of
education aid to return to their districts ready to dispel the misperception that
Senate Bill 795 only helped African-American students in Baltimore, if
challenged on the point.
Finally, no account of the impact of race on the Bradford case would be
complete without mentioning Delegate Howard "Pete" Rawlings. Delegate
Rawlings served as both the harshest critic of the Baltimore schools and one of
their biggest champions in the state legislature. From his position as the
powerful chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, Delegate
Rawlings spearheaded efforts to withhold money from Baltimore until it agreed
to join the City-State partnership. When Rawlings, who was African-American,
called for management reforms, opponents could not readily dismiss his
criticism in racial terms. The Baltimore Sun quoted Rawlings as saying, "You
can't call me a racist .... I'm in a position to raise these questions.' 28
Interestingly, Delegate Rawlings's counterpart in the Senate perceived the
situation differently. Former Senator Barbara Hoffman, who is white, believed
taking power away from Baltimore "was a much bigger struggle for Pete
Rawlings because he had more to lose by speaking out and got called all kinds
of names., 129 Whatever the truth, Rawlings and Hoffman made a powerful
125. Goering Interview, supra note 27.
126. See Ryan, supra note 122, at 460, 473-74 (1999).
127. Id. at 476.
128. Peter Jensen, Rawlings Undeterred by Flak over School Aid, BALT. SUN, Feb. 17, 1996, at IA.
129. Hoffman Interview, supra note 95.
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team. He served as an emissary to the black community explaining the need for
the City-State partnership while she urged the white community to meet its
funding obligations to Baltimore regardless of race. Their partnership and the
coalition that emerged after the signing of the consent decree prompted former
Mayor Kurt Schmoke to observe, "Race was always a complicating factor, but
the players in the whole drama did not neatly divide along racial lines."
1 30
IV. THE RETURN TO COURT
Three years of relative calm followed the passage of Senate Bill 795 as
Baltimore restructured its school system and invested in its schools. The Mayor
and Govemor appointed a new Board of School Commissioners, which in turn
hired Robert Schiller, former State Superintendent of Michigan, as interim
CEO in the summer of 1997. Schiller proved to be a dynamic leader as he laid a
solid foundation for future reforms. Lawmakers had inserted a provision into
Senate Bill 795 prohibiting the interim CEO from seeking the position on a
permanent basis.' 31 Although this provision may have encouraged some
opponents to wait out his reform efforts, Schiller used his short tenure to his
advantage as he set about aggressively restructuring the school system. He
replaced over a dozen ineffective principals and initiated contract negotiations
with the teachers' union to create a comprehensive performance evaluation
system tied to student achievement. Schiller spent the first installment of
Bradford money to reduce elementary class size and establish after-school
academies for at-risk students. In just six months, Baltimore hired 1062 new
teachers and called an additional 166 teachers out of retirement.' 32 The General
Assembly was so impressed with Schiller's performance that it voted to extend
his tenure until the end of the 1997-98 school year. 133 At that point, the Board
of School Commissioners named Robert Booker as his permanent successor.
In 1999, the Board and the State commissioned an independent evaluation
of their efforts as required by the consent decree and Senate Bill 795.134 Metis
Associates examined the Master Plan and early implementation efforts,
concluding that Baltimore had "made meaningful progress" toward improving
the quality of its public schools. 135 It in turn commissioned an adequacy study
by the Council of the Great City Schools, a non-profit organization based in
130. Schmoke Interview, supra note 57.
131. An Act Concerning Primary and Secondary Education-New Baltimore City Board of School
Commissioners, 1997 MD. LAWS 105.
132. Baltimore City Public School System, A New Era of School Reform, at
http://www.baltimorecityschools.org/About/History/NewEra2.asp (last visited Apr. 19, 2004).
133. An Act Concerning Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners-Statutory Deadlines,
1998 MD. LAWS 597.
134. See 1997 MD. LAWS 105.
135. JoAnna Daemmrich, Baltimore Making Progress in School Reform, Study Says, BALT. SUN,
Feb. 2, 2000, at 4A (quoting report by Metis Associates, Inc.).
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Washington, D.C. that had conducted similar studies in Philadelphia and New
York. The study was released in January 2000 and incorporated into the formal
evaluation issued the next month. The study confirmed what the plaintiffs had
known at the time they signed the consent decree--even with the influx of new
money from the state, funding remained far below the level needed to provide
an adequate education in Baltimore. The study estimated that Baltimore needed
to increase its expenditure of $7576 per pupil to $10,274 in order to achieve
adequacy.' 36 The $2698 per-pupil increase would have cost the system over
$260 million a year.137
Pursuant to the consent decree, the Board of School Commissioners
submitted a supplemental budget request to the state. It did not ask for the full
$265 million immediately, but instead proposed a more modest increase of
$49.7 million for operating costs and $40 million for capital improvements in
fiscal year 2001. The City bolstered its budget request by pointing to a record
of academic improvement in the first year of the City-State Partnership. Sixty-
five percent of elementary schools had improved their first grade reading scores
on the Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills, and sixty-three percent had
improved their second grade scores.138 The City had also posted gains on its
total School Performance Index (SPI), a composite of MSPAP scores,
attendance, and functional test scores. Its SPI had risen from 16.1 in 1998 to
17.0 in 1999, the first time since MSPAP testing began in 1992 that
Baltimore's score increased at a faster rate than the state average.39
The state welcomed the achievement gains but told Baltimore it needed to
give existing reforms more time to work before requesting additional money.
The Bradford plaintiffs protested. They pointed to the provision in the consent
decree committing the state to use "best efforts" to meet supplemental funding
requests from the Board of School Commissioners. 14  Beth McCallum
136. COUNCIL OF THE GREAT CITY SCHOOLS, ADEQUATE FINANCING OF URBAN SCHOOLS: AN
ANALYSIS OF FUNDING OF THE BALTIMORE CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS 20 (2000), available at
http://www.cgcs.org/pdfs/BaltimoreFinanceReport.pdf. The figure produced by the Council should be
taken with a grain of salt, because the report lacked the methodological sophistication of the "successful
schools" study commissioned by the Thornton Commission. See infra Part V. The report looked at
average spending in the eight highest-performing school districts in Maryland. It then multiplied the per-
pupil expenditures in these districts by the "virtual enrollment" of Baltimore. The report calculated
virtual enrollment by counting each poor student in Baltimore as 1.2 students and each special education
student as 2.3 students. COUNCIL OF THE GREAT CITY SCHOOLS, supra, at 19. The weights were not
Maryland-specific but rather drawn from a national study conducted a decade earlier. Moreover, the
study failed to apply the weights when calculating the per-pupil spending in the high-performing school
districts, exposing it to charges that it overestimated the cost of an adequate education in Baltimore by
failing to acknowledge that part of the high spending in successful districts resulted from efforts to help
their own special needs students.
137. Howard Libit, Schools Taking a Second Look at State Aid, BALT. SUN, June 18, 2000, at lB.
138. Baltimore City Public School System, Building on Success: A Remedy Plan to Address
Continuing Funding Needs of the Baltimore City Public School System (1999) (on file with author).
139. Id.
140. See Consent Decree, supra note 80, at 16.
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explained, "That provision was in the consent decree because everybody knew
from day one that the $50 million a year wasn't going to be enough to achieve
adequacy." 141 Susan Goering agreed, "We made clear in 1997 when this thing
got passed that it was just a downpayment on what was truly needed for reform.
Nobody was under any illusions that the City was going to create this massive
reform with $50 million.' 142
Unable to make headway in negotiations, Baltimore and the ACLU filed for
an expedited hearing on their funding request. 143 Governor Glendening
responded on June 21, 2000 by offering Baltimore a $30 million settlement.
Baltimore rejected the offer, and Judge Kaplan presided over a hearing on June
26, 2000. Beth McCallum felt the ACLU returned to court in a strong position.
She explained:
By the time we got two years into it, we had some decent, statistically significant
scores that showed [the City-State partnership] had been working. But we also had
our jointly appointed independent auditor saying we still needed an additional
$2700 per student to achieve adequacy. 144
The plaintiffs could also point to Maryland's $1 billion projected budget
surplus and $4.4 billion multi-year tobacco settlement. Their decision in 1997
to delay seeking a full financial remedy until healthier fiscal times had indeed
proved prophetic.
Judge Kaplan sided with the plaintiffs just four days after the hearing. He
held that the State had failed to meets its constitutional obligation to provide an
adequate education and suggested that Baltimore needed an additional $2000 to
$2600 per pupil to achieve adequacy. 145 Judge Kaplan declined to order
specific spending, but the per-pupil figures he cited from the interim evaluation
implied that Baltimore required approximately $267 million annually to
achieve adequacy.
The State found the price tag unacceptable and appealed. The appeal turned
the tables on Baltimore and forced it to decide whether it was willing to make
concessions in order to avoid the risk of an adverse judgment. Martin
O'Malley, the new mayor who had only been in office for nine months, decided
to avoid a showdown with the State and accept a settlement in January 2001. At
141. McCallum Interview, supra note 45.
142. Goering Interview, supra note 27.
143. See The New Board of School Commissioners and the Bradford Plaintiffs' Joint
Memorandum in Support of the New Board's Petition for Further Relief Pursuant to the Consent Decree
at 53, Bradford v. Md. State Bd. of Educ., Nos. 94-340058 & 95-258055 (Md. Cir. Ct., filed June 9,
2000) [hereinafter Joint Petition for Further Relief] (characterizing the request for $49.7 million in fiscal
year 2001 as an "essential 'downpayment"' on the full adequacy remedy quantified in the interim
evaluation of consent decree),
144. McCallum Interview, supra note 45. McCallum added, "It was nice to go in and be able to say
to Judge Kaplan that [the agreement] hammered out three years ago had worked." Id. See also Joint
Petition for Further Relief, supra note 143, at 13 ("The BCPSS' scores on the statewide MSPAP tests
have shown steady increase during the Consent Decree period .... ").
145. M. Dion Thompson, City Pupils Lack Funds, Judge Rules, BALT. SUN, July 1, 2000, at I B.
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$55 million, the settlement came much closer to Governor Glendening's initial
settlement offer than to Judge Kaplan's ruling. The gap was tolerated because,
as discussed below, Maryland had already set in motion a process for revising
the statewide funding formula. The Mayor worried about upsetting this process
with a court battle and did not want to squander political capital by pressing for
enforcement of Judge Kaplan's ruling when a statewide remedy was already in
the pipeline.
Once again, though, the independence the ACLU gained from representing
a class of students rather than the school district allowed it to press on when
Baltimore sounded the retreat. The ACLU refused to endorse the $55 million
settlement and announced its intention to defend Judge Kaplan's ruling on
appeal. 146 This decision placed the State in the awkward position of having
announced a settlement that failed to end the court case. Governor Glendening
responded by ordering the attorneys for the State to drop their appeal. 147 The
order represented a serious legal blunder on the part of the Governor, for it
allowed Judge Kaplan's ruling to stand and become the law of the case.
148
Rather than buying peace for $55 million with no outstanding legal liability, the
State found itself forced to pay $55 million while leaving the $267 million
judgment against it in place, all because the ACLU stood firm and asserted its
independence from Baltimore.
V. THE THORNTON COMMISSION AND THE PROCESS OF DEFINING ADEQUACY
Between the initial passage of Senate Bill 795 in 1997 and the reopening of
the Bradford case in 2000, the General Assembly and Governor Glendening
established a commission to study the school finance system of Maryland and
recommend changes.149 After getting off to a rocky start, the Commission on
Education Finance, Equity, and Excellence-generally called the Thornton
Commission after Alvin Thornton, its chairman and former President of the
Prince George's County School Board-emerged as a model for conducting the
process of calculating the cost of an adequate education. The Thornton
Commission's recommendations sparked the most comprehensive reform of the
education funding system in modem Maryland history.
The history of the Thornton Commission and the Bradford case are
inextricably intertwined. Strictly speaking, Bradford did not force the creation
146. Erika Niedowski, School Funding Plan Is Opposed, BALT. SUN, Jan. 26, 2001, at 3B.
147. Maryland Attorney General's Office Interview, supra note 79.
148. Governor Glendening's reasons for terminating the appeal are unclear. His term was drawing
to a close in 18 months, and there was speculation that he hoped to be appointed Secretary of Education
if Al Gore were elected in 2000. See Daniel LeDuc, New Role Elevates Glendening's National Profile,
WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1999, at M5. Actively fighting a school finance case on appeal would have cast a
shadow over his generally pro-education record as Governor.
149. An Act Concerning Commission on Education Finance, Equity, and Excellence, 1999 MD.
LAWS 601.
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of the Thornton Commission. 15 But the Bradford settlement did serve both
directly and indirectly as an impetus for the formation of the Commission. The
direct impact arose from the recognition that the 1997 settlement did not meet
the full costs of providing an adequate education to the students of
Baltimore. 151 Those interested in providing a complete remedy wanted to
understand the true cost of achieving adequacy. They also viewed the adequacy
study as a useful tool in case circumstances forced the plaintiffs to return to
court in pursuit of more money. Baltimore additionally hoped that an adequacy
study would lend support to its claim that a lack of resources rather than
deficient management accounted for the low performance of its students.
The indirect impact of Bradford on the establishment of the Thornton
Commission was twofold. First, the success of the Bradford case emboldened
other school systems in Maryland, which began contemplating their own
lawsuits against the State. Counties on the rural Eastern Shore of the
Chesapeake Bay, several of which had participated in the original Hornbeck
litigation, were the most vocal in this regard. 152 The Thornton Commission
represented both a genuine and cynical response to the threat of additional
litigation. Former Senator Hoffman, who served on the Commission, described
both motivations. She said, "Part of what we did with Thornton was to keep
people out of court. It was an attempt to say that we were really going to try to
solve the problem."' 153 But she then added, "I guess there were some people
who wanted to do the Thornton Commission just as a way to keep from having
to do anything."'' 54 This second group of lawmakers viewed the Commission as
a substitute for action, placating school districts in the short term without
producing substantial change.
The second indirect link between Bradford and the creation of the Thornton
Commission was equally complicated. Some of the most outspoken proponents
of creating a school finance commission came from the ranks of legislators who
most resented the consent decree and Senate Bill 795. It was these lawmakers
who had pushed to broaden the Bradford remedy in the belief that Baltimore
was receiving a disproportionate benefit while the poor children in their own
counties were being ignored. They watched in dismay as the Governor steered
$18 million in new funding to Prince George's County and $13.4 million to
150. Even the attorneys for the Bradford plaintiffs acknowledged that other political dynamics
contributed to the establishment of the Thornton Commission. Beth McCallum said, "Do I personally
believe that the Bradford case helped prompt it? Absolutely. Might you get a different answer from
legislators? Possibly." McCallum Interview, supra note 45.
15 1. Despite the acknowledged concentration of need in Baltimore, Senate Bill 795 still left the
City spending only $19 per pupil above the state average in 1998. See THORNTON COMMISSION,
PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 6, tbl. 12.
152. Interview with Chris Maher, Education Director, Advocates for Children & Youth, in
Baltimore, Md. (Jan. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Maher Interview].




Baltimore in 1998.155 They grew even more alarmed when Prince George's
County extracted an additional $140 million in the same legislative session to
help it construct up to sixteen new neighborhood schools needed to dissolve its
longstanding federal desegregation order. 56 According to lawmakers, this
piecemeal distribution of aid allowed the Governor to reward his most loyal
political constituencies at the expense of the rest of the state. 157 They argued
that the situation called for a statewide solution. The reference to "equity" in
the title of the commission did not reflect a concern for the special needs of
poor districts so much as it reflected the desire of middle-class counties to
establish a comprehensive education funding formula that would displace the
system of alleged favoritism that had emerged in the wake of the Bradford
settlement.
The Thornton Commission began work in November 1999 by conducting a
comprehensive analysis of the existing funding system.' 58 It then set about
defining the scope of its mission and developing a working plan. The
Commission spent much of 2000 debating interim recommendations about how
the State should proceed while the Commission worked on its report. Only at
the end of 2000 did it begin calculating the cost of an adequate education.
The Commission defined adequacy as the amount of money required for
students to meet state standards, as measured primarily by satisfactory
performance on the MSPAP. 159 This functional definition simplified the work
of the Commission. Like the use of MSPAP scores in the Bradford suit,
defining adequacy with reference to state standards invoked the political
legitimacy of existing legislative judgments about the purposes of public
education. It allowed the Thornton Commission to avoid the thorny task of
articulating its own vision for the schools, and accordingly deflected the
criticism commonly levied against unelected bodies that attempt to develop
independent definitions of adequacy out of whole cloth.160 Although the
155. See Thomas W. Waldron, $68 Million in Aid to Local Schools Gets Final Assembly OK, BALT.
SUN, Apr. 10, 1998, at 4B.
156. See Robert E. Pierre, Assembly Approves Pr. George's School Funding, WASH. POST, Apr. 14,
1998, at B 1.
157. See Editorial, Glendening's School Aid: The Sequel, BALT. SUN, Aug. 6, 1997, at 12A.
158. See THORNTON COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 6.
159. The Commission described an adequate financing system in its final report as one that
establishes a "direct link between what is expected of school systems and the level of funding that
school systems receive." COMM'N. ON EDUC. FIN., EQUITY, & EXCELLENCE, FINAL REPORT 51 (2002),
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/other/education/final/2002_final report.pdf [hereinafter THORNTON
COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT].
160. See, e.g., Dietz, supra note 44, at 1211-12 ("When a court starts from scratch to create its own
laundry list of fundamental goals for public education, the conclusion seems inescapable that the court is
legislating, which is an unacceptable violation of the separation of powers."); Troy Reynolds, Note,
Education Finance Reform Litigation and Separation of Powers: Kentucky Makes Its Contribution, 80
KY. L.J. 309, 335 (1992) ("[Sltrict adherence to traditional legislative or executive roles precludes a
court from judicially defining a qualitatively adequate education.... [S]uch judicial intrusions are
fraught with the danger of seemingly endless litigation and problems ofjudicial management.").
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Thornton definition of adequacy might be criticized for focusing too narrowly
on money as a determinate of educational achievement, it must be remembered
that the link to state standards reflected the fact that the Commission operated
against a background system of accountability designed to ensure the money it
recommended would be well spent.
In November 2000, the Thornton Commission hired the firm of Augenblick
& Myers to conduct an adequacy study. It soon found itself confronted by the
same methodological choices as Wyoming, Ohio, and other states that have
attempted to define adequacy in the wake of school finance litigation. The
Commission focused on two primary methods for calculating the cost of an
adequate education: the "successful schools" approach and the "professional
judgment" model. Since each method presented its own host of promises and
pitfalls, the Commission asked Augenblick & Myers to employ both
techniques.
The successful schools approach as practiced in Maryland looked to
schools already meeting state standards and examined their spending patterns.
The Maryland study proved somewhat unusual insofar as it marked the first
large-scale use of the successful schools method with individual schools as the
unit of analysis. The successful schools approach has traditionally looked to
high-performing school systems, but because Maryland contains such large
school districts, no single district uniformly met state standards. Examining
individual schools introduced an additional degree of complexity into the study
because Augenblick & Myers had to estimate the percentage of district-level
administrative costs attributable to each school, but it also produced some
countervailing benefits. The State Department of Education identified fifty-nine
elementary, middle, and high schools that met or exceeded state standards for
MSPAP scores, attendance, and the drop-out rate. It did not select the highest
performing schools in the state, but rather attempted to maximize the
geographic, economic, and racial diversity of the pool. The performance
threshold somewhat constrained efforts to diversify the sample,' 61 but
Maryland was still able to include more variability by examining individual
schools than it could have by looking at district-wide averages.
Another notable aspect of the Maryland successful schools study is that it
probed beneath official spending figures in an effort to identify actual spending
patterns. Augenblick & Myers surveyed the schools in the study to determine
the amount each school received in donations of time and money. The surveys
revealed that ninety-seven percent of elementary schools received monetary
support or donations of equipment, which averaged $72 per pupil across all
161. For example, no schools from Prince George's County or Baltimore appeared in the sample.
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schools. 162 Ninety percent of middle schools received support, which averaged
$39 per pupil. 163 All the high schools studied received support, with an average
of $121 per pupil, much of it dedicated to athletic programs.'64 In addition,
volunteers contributed 13.4 hours per pupil in elementary school, 1.2 hours per
pupil in middle school, and 6.1 hours per pupil in high school. 165 To the extent
that less-successful schools lack access to the same level of community wealth
and volunteer time, adequacy studies that fail to adjust for these informal
resources will underestimate the true cost of providing an adequate education.
In this respect, Maryland provides a model for other states interested in
conducting accurate adequacy studies.
The most obvious criticism of the successful schools approach as practiced
in Maryland is that it failed to account for varying levels of student need in
calculating the cost of an adequate education. The study tried to compensate
partially for this deficiency by selecting as diverse a sample of schools as
possible and examining informal community resources, but in general it made
no adjustments based on poverty, peer effects, family status, and other
demographic factors that may influence achievement. In theory, the inability to
make these adjustments is not an inherent failing of the successful schools
approach. A sophisticated econometric regression with sufficient data about
individual students could support the development of weights modifying the
funding formula based on the link between background characteristics and
student need. But states that undertake such an effort may find themselves
confronting the same problems as Maryland, which discovered that the schools
meeting state standards contained a slightly below-average number of special
education students and a much lower proportion of students eligible for free or
reduced-price lunch. 166 Had Maryland attempted to derive pupil weights from
its successful schools study, it would have been forced to draw conclusions
about how to treat entire categories of students from tiny samples.
The Thornton Commission turned instead to a professional judgment
approach to obtain per-pupil weights adjusting the funding formula for the cost
of educating students with special needs. It assembled six panels of educational
experts to design prototypical schools for a district with 30,000 students. The
panels were told to assume that 13.5% of students were eligible for special
education, 31% were eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, and 2% had
limited English proficiency. 167 The panels identified a series of programs and
staffing arrangements needed to meet state standards in the prototypical
162. See id. at 24.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. Id. at 25.
166. See id. at 20.
167. Id. at 13.
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schools. An oversight panel then synthesized their recommendations into a
single model. Augenblick & Myers calculated the cost for each component of
the prototype and devised weights for special needs students based on the
features of each school identified by the experts as intended to help such
students. An independent collection of advocacy organizations and individuals,
the New Maryland Education Coalition, also conducted its own professional
judgment study. 168 It coordinated with the Thornton Commission to use similar
baseline assumptions so that the studies would complement one another.
The professional judgment approach is not immune from criticism. By
looking to prototypes rather than real schools with a demonstrated record of
success, it risks relying too heavily on educational theory in a field notoriously
plagued by fads. But this critique proves relatively weak, since successful
schools may also follow fads unrelated to their achievement results, and the
experts on panels tend to be experienced educators drawing not just from
theory but also from a deep reservoir of knowledge accumulated over years of
practice. The more serious criticism of the professional judgment model arises
from the suspicion that it might systematically inflate the reported cost of
providing an adequate education. Augenblick & Myers explained, "Our
observation is that participants in the professional judgment approach find it
very difficult to focus exclusively on those resources, and only those, that are
needed so that a school might meet a particular outcome, such as a level of
pupil performance or a rate of attendance. ,1 69 Even if no such distortion exists,
opponents in the political arena can dismiss the determinations made by a
professional judgment panel as self-interested and therefore unreliable.
Given the flaws associated with both the successful schools and
professional judgment approaches, the Thornton Commission chose to use
them in tandem. The decision to treat the models as complements became
significantly easier after the studies produced relatively similar estimates of the
cost of an adequate education. The successful schools approach produced a
base cost figure of $5969 per pupil in 1999-2000, unadjusted for student
need. 70 The Augenblick & Myers professional judgment study calculated the
average cost of each prototypical school to be $10,631 per pupil, with a base
cost of $6612 per pupil remaining after the authors stripped away the spending
attributable to special needs students.' The New Maryland EducationCoalition reported the results of its three professional judgment panels
168. MGMT. ANALYSIS & PLANNING, INC., A PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT APPROACH TO
DETERMINING ADEQUATE EDUCATION FUNDING IN MARYLAND (2001), available at
http://216.50.9.34/webdata/MAPFinalReport.pdf [hereinafter MAP INC. REPORT].
169. AUGENBLICK & MYERS, INC., supra note 161, at 28.
170. Id. at 23.
171. Id. at 17.
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separately as $9313, $7461, and $9215 per pupil. 172 The study did not strip
away the costs associated with special needs students to produce a base figure,
so its estimates should be compared to the $10,631 figure produced by the
Augenblick & Myers panels rather than the adjusted amount of $6612 reported
in the final study.
The variations from study to study reflect the imprecision inherent in any
attempt to calculate the cost of an adequate education.' 73 Nevertheless, the
Thornton Commission found itself in the fortunate position of not having to
reconcile any major discrepancies. Indeed, the relative similarity of the figures
bolstered the credibility of the individual studies. Chris Maher of Advocates for
Children and Youth, which was instrumental in organizing the New Maryland
Education Coalition report, explained, "There was a lot of credence lent to
them because professional judgment and successful schools came out with
relatively similar numbers as far as what was recommended for adequacy."'
' 74
This bolstering effect may prove unique to Maryland, though, since the risk of
multiple studies undermining rather than complementing one another
persists. 175
After much debate, the Thornton Commission adopted a two-tier funding
recommendation. It started with the base cost identified in the successful
schools study and adjusted it downward to account for teacher retirement
payments from the state and other general aid programs slated to continue. This
calculation produced a figure of $5443 per pupil in 2002.176 The Commission
then applied per-pupil weights derived from the professional judgment model
to account for special needs. It determined that districts needed 2.17 times the
base cost ($11,811) for each special education student, 2.10 times the base cost
($11,430) for each student eligible to receive free or reduce price meals, and 2
times the base cost ($10,886) for each Limited English Proficiency student. 177
The assignment of student weights proved controversial. Educators debated
whether the Commission should add a concentration of poverty factor to
account for the unique challenges facing schools with a high number of poor
students.178 Critics also took issue with the Commission's decision to reduce
172. MAP INC. REPORT, supra note 168, at 10 tbl.7.
173. The Augenblick & Myers report cautioned that "the figures produced should be viewed as
reasonable estimates rather than as precise calculations." AUGENBLICK & MYERS, INC., supra note 161,
at 4.
174. Maher Interview, supra note 152.
175. See James E. Ryan & Thomas Saunders, Foreword to Symposium on School Finance
Litigation: Emerging Trends or New Dead Ends?, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 463,477 (2004).
176. THORNTON COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT, supra note 159, at 53.
177. Seeid. at55.
178. Compare Minutes of the Comm'n. on Educ. Fin., Equity, and Excellence 6 (Nov. 19, 2001)
(statement of Carmen Russo, CEO, Baltimore City Public School System), available at
http://mlis.state.md.us/other/education/I11901 _minutes.pdf, with id. at 7 (statement of Mark Beytin,
Chairman of the Maryland State Teachers Association Legislative Committee).
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the weights based on an "overlap" analysis. 179 The original professional
judgment study had called for poor students to receive 2.39 times the base
cost.1 80 The Thornton Commission lowered the figure after noting that twenty
percent of students eligible for free and reduced-price meals also qualified for
special education or LEP services and should not be double-counted. 1
81
The overlap analysis, combined with several other adjustments, allowed the
Thornton Commission to reduce the magnitude of its final recommendations in
response to Maryland's weakening fiscal situation. The adequacy studies had
identified $2.7 billion in unmet annual need, but the final Thornton
Commission report proposed increasing funding by $1.1 billion. Moreover, it
phased in the suggested funding increases over five years, with most of the
augmentation coming in the final two years.
82
These adjustments serve as an important reminder that the process of
calculating the cost of an adequate education is not a purely objective,
technocratic exercise. 83 Producing a final report involved hundreds of
interrelated decisions. For instance, the Thornton Commission had to decide
which areas to exclude from its analysis. 184 It also had to determine how to
account for local variations in the cost of educational inputs. 85 In making these
decisions, the Commission did not remain immune from political pressure. In
fact, nine of its twenty-seven members served in the General Assembly, and
another three held elected positions in local government. 1
86
Although it is tempting to criticize the Thornton Commission and speculate
whether a politically insulated body of experts could have resisted the pressure
to introduce budgetary considerations into its needs-driven analysis, the
presence of politicians on the Commission seemed to serve as a net asset.
Participation on the Commission ensured that a core set of lawmakers would
develop a sense of ownership and have a political stake in the legislative
success of the plan. These lawmakers also lent the Commission their political
expertise. The Thornton Commission faced a difficult choice between
requesting full funding at the risk of having its report languish on a shelf
unimplemented, and lowering its sights to bolster the politically viability of its
179. See, e.g., id. at 8 (Nov. 19, 2001) (statement of Bebe Verdery, ACLU of Maryland).
180. See AUGENBLICK & MYERS, INC., supra note 161, at 2 (deriving a weight for low income
students but noting that it was "extraordinarily high" relative to the weight used in other states).
181. THORNTON COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT, supra note 159, at 17.
182. See id. at 64 (characterizing the plan as "back-loaded").
183. Chris Maher described the adjustments as "totally political" and driven by the belief that a
$2.7 billion plan would not pass the General Assembly. Maher Interview, supra note 152.
184. The Commission assumed that all school facilities were adequate despite knowing that this
assumption did not reflect reality. See THORNTON COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT, supra note 159, at 81-
82.
185. See id. at 58.
186. See id. at v-vi.
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plan. ' The lawmakers on the Commission helped steer it through the Scylla of
excessive compromise and the Charybdis of overreaching. They drew upon
their political experience to advise the Commission how far it could push
without losing everything. Barbara Hoffman defended the exercise. She said,
"There was a limit to what we could realistically expect to get passed, but we
tried to do it straight." She added, "No one would think this amount of money
was a pragmatic compromise." The Commission had reduced the size of its
proposal, but the $1.1 billion it recommended still represented a thirty-eight
percent increase for a state spending $2.9 billion a year on education.
VI. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THORNTON
Despite the reductions made by the Thornton Commission, the call for $1.1
billion in new spending received an icy reception in Annapolis. Senate
President Mile Miller, who had incorrectly predicted the demise of the
Bradford remedy in 1997, said the proposal "could not come at a worse time"
and warned that the deepening recession would prevent Maryland from
implementing any new spending initiatives. Montgomery County similarly
signaled its opposition to the plan. Its two representatives on the Thornton
Commission had dissented in the final vote and filed a minority report.
1 89
Montgomery County objected in particular to the inclusion of wealth-
equalization provisions reducing the size of special-needs grants based on the
fiscal capacity of local districts to fund supplementary programs on their own.
In the face of this opposition, proponents of the Thornton legislation
invoked the threat of a lawsuit.190 Baltimore remained well positioned to return
to court seeking enforcement of Judge Kaplan's order.1 9 1 The Thornton report
provided the plaintiffs with a treasure trove of information. As Barbara
Hoffman put it, "Once you've gone through this exercise and proved [the lack
of adequate funding], you don't really have a fig leaf to hide behind. You are
exposed legally."192 In addition, the report handed a half-dozen other school
187. In many ways, this selection between principle and pragmatism tracks the "difficult, if
familiar, strategic choice" Professor Enrich invoked to frame the shift from equity to adequacy in school
finance litigation. See Enrich, supra note 109, at 182.
188. David Nitkin, "Edgy" Capital Session Likely, BALT. SUN, Jan. 6, 2002, at IA.
189. THORNTON COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT, supra note 159, at 89-92a (2002) (minority
statement of Del. Sheila Hixson and Del. Jean Cryor).
190. See, e.g., Letter from Sen. Barbara Hoffman & Sen. Nathaniel McFadden, to Gov. Parris
Glendening 2 (Jan. 26, 2002) ("We're sure that you remember that under the terms of the bill [SB 795]
and the court settlement, it is likely that we will find ourselves back in court if the state does not attempt
to meet some of these needs ....").
191. McCallum Interview, supra note 45 ("It was helpful for education funding advocates to be
able to say, 'Hey, there is this court order.' We said it as many times as we could, as loudly as we
could.").
192. Hoffman Interview, supra note 95.
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systems ready-made lawsuits.1 93
The threat of litigation alone, however, is not sufficient to explain the
passage of the Thornton recommendations.' 94 Like in 1997, proponents were
forced to assemble a coalition to support the legislation. Their efforts once
again shed light on the effectiveness of broadening a school finance remedy to
include beneficiaries from across the state. Chris Maher of Advocates for
Children and Youth described how a working group of public interest
organizations sat down with a map of Maryland to plan strategy. 195 They knew
they could count on the votes of Baltimore and Prince George's County, both
of which benefited substantially under the Thornton plan. They also anticipated
receiving support from the rural eastern and western portions of the state,
which also struggled to fund their schools. The formation of this rural-urban
coalition gave proponents of the legislation a solid base of support and allowed
them to concentrate their efforts on the few key suburban counties that held the
swing votes.
They first appealed to the self-interest of suburban lawmakers. Advocates
for Children and Youth prepared single-page briefing sheets for every
lawmaker in the General Assembly. Each sheet told lawmakers how much
additional money the Thornton recommendations would send to schools in their
district. Next to this figure, the organization presented district-specific polling
information showing overwhelming support for the legislation. The sheets then
described the results of a statewide poll showing that a slim majority of
Maryland residents would even be willing to pay higher taxes to increase
education funding.1 96 The final statistic on each sheet showed lawmakers how
much the schools in their districts needed to improve in order to meet state
performance standards.
The coalition also courted conservative lawmakers. It pointed out that the
Thornton legislation would replace a series of complicated categorical
programs and duplicative reporting requirements with transparent block grants
that would facilitate accountability.' 97 In the end, three Republicans in the
House and three in the Senate broke ranks to vote for the final bill despite the
fact that it included a tax increase.
193. Maher Interview, supra note 152 ("The threat of litigation was extremely significant, because
not only did we have Prince George's County talking about it, but we had the Eastern Shore Consortium
lined up.").
194. Not all lawmakers were cowed by the prospect of legal action. Kumar Barve, the chairman of
the Montgomery County delegation who later became Majority Leader of the House of Delegates after
the 2002 election, challenged counties with legal claims to sue and settle the issue in court. See Howard
Libit, Funding for Diversity, BALT. SUN, Feb. 10, 2002, at I B.
195. Maher Interview, supra note 152.
196. See David Nitkin & Sarah Koenig, Voters Back Slots, Taxes for Schools, BALT. SUN, Jan. 9,
2002, at 1A (describing how fifty-two percent of respondents expressed a willingness to pay higher
taxes to fund the schools).
197. Maher Interview, supra note 152.
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Even with a broad coalition in place, advocates found that they lacked the
votes to pass the Thornton legislation over the opposition of the Montgomery
County delegation. Barbara Hoffman consequently decided to broaden the
remedy even further and inserted a provision into the Bridge to Excellence in
Public Schools Act increasing aid to Montgomery County by $80 million a year
in the name of helping its large population of LEP students. She defended the
move as remaining largely true to the Thornton framework. 198 Chris Maher was
less sanguine:
It was an absolute pure political buyout. At that point, we were faced as a coalition
with a choice. We could give Montgomery their money and give everyone else in
the state a lot more money, or we could trash it all. The choice was pretty clear. We
had to go with it.
199
Whatever the reality, broadening the remedy once again proved effective. The
Montgomery County delegation switched overnight from being the biggest
opponent of the legislation to being one of its most outspoken supporters.
200
With the help of Montgomery County, lawmakers even pushed through a 34-
cent increase in the tobacco tax to fund the first two years of the legislation.
The long-term stability of the Bridge to Excellence in Public Schools Act
remains uncertain, however. The law, which passed in an election year, did not
identify a revenue source beyond the first two years. In 2002, "virtually every
politician in the state pledged to find a way to fund the new education aid
formula." 20 1 Lawmakers reaffirmed their commitment to full funding in 2004
by repealing a "trigger" that would have automatically reduced funding levels
in the absence of a joint resolution certifying that the plan was affordable. 20 2
But long-term funding remains stalled by a dispute between Governor Robert
Ehrlich, Jr. and the Speaker of the House of Delegates over whether to pay for
the spending increases with slot machine revenue or new taxes.
VII. THE IMPACT OF THE BRADFORD SUIT ON STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT
Measured in terms of inputs, the Bradford case has been remarkably
successful. Baltimore spent $5565 per pupil and ranked fifteenth the state in the
school year that preceded the filing of the Bradford suit. 20 3 By the 2000-2001
school year, it expended $8790 per pupil, and only two school districts spent
198. Hoffman Interview, supra note 95.
199. Maher Interview, supra note 152.
200. See, e.g., id. ("They were against it and then they got their buyout. After that, they could not
have been a stronger ally. There has never been a sharper 180.").
201. Lori Montgomery & Tim Craig, Lawmakers Vow to Fund Thornton Program, WASH. POST,
Jan. 31, 2004, at B 1.
202. An Act Concerning Bridge to Excellence in Public Schools Act-Trigger Provision-Repeal,
2004 MD. LAWS 6.
203. See MD. STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 1, at 15 thl. 15.
Yale Law & Policy Review
more. 20 4 In terms of money actually spent on instruction, Baltimore ranked
twentieth in the state in 1993-94.205 By 2000-2001, it ranked fourth.206 The
growth in spending was particularly pronounced after 1997 when Baltimore
received its first installation in remedial funding. Spending on instructional
materials rose from $13 million per year to $23 million annually over the first
three years of the remedy.207 Funding for library books increased from
$377,402 to $3.5 million.20 8 Expenditures for textbooks exploded from $2.4
million in 1996-97 to $12.4 million in 1998-99 and $11.7 million in 1999-
2000.209 After several years of catch-up spending, Baltimore then drastically
scaled back its purchases of books and materials in 2000-2001.210
Baltimore received an additional funding boost of $55 million after
returning to court in 2000. Passage of the Thornton legislation freed up $18.5
million more in 2002 with much larger increases slated for the future.211 If the
General Assembly maintains its commitment to fund the law, Baltimore will
see its state aid rise in accelerating increments over the next five years. By
2008, it will receive $258.6 million more per year than it did in 2002, a 44.3%
increase.212 The increase will enable Baltimore to spend $13,496 per pupil in
2007213 with $9143 of that amount coming directly from the State. 21
4
Early infusions of money were generally well spent. The official
independent evaluation of the City-State partnership concluded in 2001,
"The extra financial supports provided by Annapolis ... have been invested
appropriately on areas of identified need.''215 Baltimore earmarked the majority
of new money for initiatives aimed at enhancing elementary school education
and recruiting high-quality teachers and principals. The City reduced class size
to twenty students in grades one and two. It maintained its pre-kindergarten
programs in 111 schools and added full-day kindergarten to an additional
thirty-eight schools. 216 It then adopted a uniform reading curriculum, so that
204. See id.
205. See id. at 16 tbl.16.
206. See id.
207. Id. at 12 tbl.12.
208. Id. at 14 tbl.14.
209. Id. at 13 tbl.13.
210. Spending on instructional materials dropped by 48.5% to $11.9 million in 2000-2001. Id. at 12
tbl.12. Spending on library books dropped by 90.6% to $327,806. Id. at 14 tbl.14. Spending on
textbooks dropped by 79.7% to $2.4 million. Id. at 13 tbl.13.
211. BALT. CITY PUB. SCH. SYS., MASTER PLAN II: 2002-2007, at 20 (2002) (on file with author)
[hereinafter BCPSS, MASTER PLAN II].
212. See DEP'T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., supra note 3, at exhibit 8.
213. See supra note 3.
214. See DEP'T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., supra note 3, at exhibit 9.
215. WESTAT, REPORT ON THE FINAL EVALUATION OF THE CITY-STATE PARTNERSHIP xxiv (2001),
available at http://www.bcps.kl2.md.us/SchoolBoard/pdf/west stat/bcpss-final-report.pdf [hereinafter
WESTAT REPORT].
216. Id. at 104. These numbers are expected to increase even further in the wake of Thornton, since
the Bridge to Excellence in Public Schools Act mandates full-day kindergarten for all students and
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highly mobile students who switched schools in the middle of the year would
maintain some continuity. Baltimore also purchased new reading and math
textbooks for every elementary school classroom in the city.
On the personnel front, Baltimore instituted a system of performance-based
evaluations that included student achievement as a category by which all
teachers would be judged. 2 17 It increased first-year teacher salaries by thirty-
seven percent (from $24,215 to $33,300) between 1997 and 2002.218 A
reduction in the number of steps in the pay scale further increased Baltimore's
competitiveness with surrounding counties, raising the size of its compensation
package from last in the state to third.2 19 Baltimore also enhanced principals'
salaries in 2001, lifting them from twentieth in the state to second.220 Baltimore
has historically scrambled to hire hundreds of new teachers in August to fill
vacancies, but in 2001 the school system filled its vacancies early. Officials
attributed the success to higher teacher salaries funded by the school finance
remedy.221 Nevertheless, the push to reduce class size has produced a marked
increase in the number of uncertified teachers. Of the 1022 teachers hired
during the 1998-99 school year, only thirty-two percent were certified, and by
2001, over a quarter of all teachers in Baltimore lacked certification.222 To help
soften the blow, Baltimore created a summer institute to train uncertified
teachers for four weeks prior to putting them in the classroom.
223
These reforms have been accompanied by modest gains in student
achievement. The Composite Index (CI) measures the number of students
scoring satisfactorily across the six subject areas of the MSPAP. 22' The CI for
Baltimore rose from 13.9% in 1996-97 to 22.5% in 2000-01. 225 Gains were
most pronounced in the early grades where Baltimore had concentrated its
resources. The third-grade CI rose from 13.4% to 23.1%, and the fifth-grade CI
rose from 14.5% to 25.3%.
Gains were fairly evenly distributed across Baltimore. Of the 120
elementary schools in the city, 109 improved their MSPAP scores between
promotes preschool for all four-year-olds living in poverty.
217. See BCPSS, MASTER PLAN II, supra note 211, at 18.
218. Liz Bowie, Study of City Schools Expected This Week, BALT. SUN, Dec. 3, 2001, at lB.
219. WESTAT REPORT, supra note 215, at 170.
220. Id.
221. Liz Bowie, City Ready with New Teachers, BALT. SUN, July 26, 2001, at lB.
222. WESTAT REPORT, supra note 215, at 172.
223. BCPSS, MASTER PLAN 1I, supra note 211, at 18.
224. The Composite Index is calculated by dividing the number of passing scores in each content
area by the total number of test takers.
225. BALTIMORE CITY PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM, STUDENT PERFORMANCE ON THE MARYLAND
SCHOOL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: 1996-97 THROUGH 2001-02, at 5 tbl.2 (2002), available at
http://www.bcps.kl 2.md.us/studentsperformance/PDF/SAMSPAP ComprehensiveReportDec2002.
pdf.
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1997 and 2002.226 Moreover, the City schools improved at a faster rate than
other schools in Maryland on many subject areas during the first five years of
the Bradford remedy, narrowing the performance gap, albeit modestly, for the
first time since the implementation of the MSPAP.227 And perhaps the brightest
moment for Baltimore came in 2002 when City first-graders exceeded the
national average on standardized reading and math exams for the first time in
more than a decade.
Despite this progress, the relentless focus on increasing student
achievement was not matched by equal attention to management issues. Poor
planning and bookkeeping across the tenure of two superintendents228 led to the
accumulation of a $58 million deficit by 2003 and more than 800 layoffs.229
The school system also experienced an acute cash-flow crunch in 2004 that left
it within days of being unable to pay its bills. The crisis revealed weaknesses in
the management structure created by the Bradford settlement, which had
diffused financial responsibility by splitting control of the schools between
Baltimore and the State. Although Mayor O'Malley eased the short-term crisis
with an emergency loan and enhanced financial oversight, the lingering deficit
will require additional cuts and consume a portion of future state aid. School
officials have begun increasing class size and eliminating summer programs.
230
Both moves potentially could threaten the student achievement gains Baltimore
has posted.
In addition, Baltimore has yet to receive a full financial remedy. It will not
reach the level of funding identified by the Thornton Commission as adequate
until 2007, and even then it will not achieve adequacy in its facilities and other
areas excluded from the Thornton analysis.231 Baltimore's early progress is
promising, but it will take many years before the impact of the Bradford
remedy is fully known.
CONCLUSION
The Bradford litigation represents an important test case on three fronts.
First, it tests whether litigants who settle their claims can produce satisfactory
and stable remedies in the long run. A number of political forces have aligned
against the Bradford plaintiffs since their initial legislative victory. Governor
226. Howard Libit, City Offers Lesson on Improvements, BALT. SUN, Mar. 5, 2002, at IA.
227. See WESTAT REPORT, supra note 215, at 21.
228. Liz Bowie, Warnings Lined Road to Disaster, BALT. SUN, Apr. 4, at IA; Tom Pelton & Laura
Vozzella, How City Schools Spiraled into Debt Almost Unchecked, BALT. SUN, Feb. 20, at 8A.
229. Tanika White, Schools Accept Funding Offer, BALT. SUN, Mar. 16, at I B.
230. See Tanika White & Liz Bowie, Schools Plan Would Boost Class Sizes, BALT. SUN, Apr. 28,
at lB.
231. The Bridge to Excellence in Public Schools Act created a separate task force to study facilities
needs. Bridge to Excellence in Public Schools Act, 2002 MD. LAWS 288.
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Glendening left office and was replaced by Maryland's first Republican
governor since Spiro Agnew. Baltimore lost legislative seats in the redistricting
that followed the 2000 Census. The City also relinquished its hold on the
chairmanship of the Senate Budget and Taxation Committee with the defeat of
Senator Barbara Hoffman in the 2002 Democratic primary, and the
chairmanship of the House Appropriations Committee with the death of
Delegate Howard Rawlings in 2003.232 If the Bradford plaintiffs weather this
storm and manage to maintain their remedy without a definitive Maryland
Court of Appeals ruling in their favor, it will provide powerful evidence that
settlements, a potentially underutilized tool in school finance litigation, do not
necessarily sacrifice long-term reform in favor of short-term gains.
Second, the Bradford case tests the viability of targeting special needs
students within the framework of a broad remedy. One of the most interesting
aspects of the Thornton legislation is that it largely mimics the remedy
Maryland would have been required to implement if the Bradford plaintiffs had
successfully sued on behalf of a statewide class of students rather than limiting
their suit to at-risk students residing in Baltimore. To the extent this broad
distribution of aid helps stabilize the gains made in Baltimore and mutes the
politics of race, it might induce plaintiffs in other states to consider suing on
behalf of an expanded class from day one. Such a strategy will not make sense
in all situations. It risks fragmenting control over school finance lawsuits and
inflating the cost of the remedies beyond the ability of states to fund them.
Indeed, the plaintiffs in Maryland itself had good reasons for concentrating
their efforts on Baltimore. Susan Goering explained:
We followed the old adage that good facts make good law. As an attorney, you take
your best case and the most compelling facts you have for a case of first impression.
Baltimore City was far and away the worst.... There wasn't even a close second
among the other counties.
233
Nevertheless, building broad-based political coalitions to support school
finance reform can help translate a right articulated in the courtroom into a
remedy. Suing on behalf of a statewide class serves as one way to begin
constructing these coalitions from the earliest stages of a lawsuit.
Finally, the Bradford case tests whether a lawsuit that focuses on money
and school management without enhancing socioeconomic and racial
integration can truly transform a disadvantaged urban school system. James
Ryan has suggested that the pursuit of integration may raise academic
achievement among isolated groups more effectively than remedies focused
strictly on money. 234 The Bradford case has set in motion another bold attempt
232. Former Governor Glendenning told the press a week after Delegate Rawlings's death, "This is
a low point in political power for the city itself." David Nitkin & Michael Dresser, Rawlings' Death
Leaves Vacuum, BALT. SUN, Nov. 16, 2003, at lB.
233. Goering Interview, supra note 27.
234. James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 308 (1999).
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to reform an urban school system using the traditional tools of school finance
litigation without enhancing integration. Baltimore has one of the most racially
segregated school systems in the country. In 2001, 87.5% of students in the
Baltimore City public schools were African-American. 235 Of the twenty-six
central city districts with over 60,000 students, only Detroit and New Orleans
exceeded Baltimore in this respect.236 The high percentage of African-
American students in Baltimore has left them largely isolated from their white
peers. On a key measure of racial isolation, only 5.9% of African-American
students in Baltimore attended schools that were more than ten percent
white.237 Baltimore ranked sixth in the nation in terms of African-American
isolation, trailing only Chicago, Detroit, Dallas, New Orleans, and Washington,
D.C.238 The Baltimore schools have also remained socioeconomically isolated,
with the percentage of elementary school students eligible for free and reduced-
price meals hovering between sixty-seven and eighty-three percent for a
decade.239 Despite this lack of integration, the early signs of academic
improvement in Baltimore are encouraging.
Depending on whether these improvements continue, the Bradford case
will provide guidance for potential litigants and scholars grappling with the
practical implications of Ryan's theory. The decision to pursue integration can
be costly for plaintiffs.240 It complicates their legal claims and appears
threatening to suburban districts. Although litigants do not face an exclusive
choice between pursuing integration or pursuing additional resources, they may
be reluctant in practice to raise integration claims unless they believe that a
more traditional finance remedy will be of little avail. If Baltimore continues on
an upward trajectory in the absence of integration, litigants may remain
reluctant to modify their legal claims along the lines suggested by Ryan. But if
the reform process stalls, Baltimore will join the list of Milliken I districts and
school systems in Connecticut and New Jersey that Ryan cites as examples of
districts that failed to improve academic achievement in the absence of
meaningful integration.
241
235. ERICA FRANKENBERG, CHUNGMEI LEE & GARY ORFIELD, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT,
HARVARD UNIV., A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE
DREAM? 54 tbl.19 (2003), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/
AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf.
236. Id. Four other systems-Los Angeles, Chicago, Dallas, and Santa Ana-had lower
percentages of white enrollment based on their sizeable Latino populations. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See Md. State Dep't of Educ., Maryland's Report Card: 2003 Performance Report: Baltimore
City, at http://msp.msde.state.md.us/specservtrend.asp?GROUP=FARM&Grade=E&Detail=NO&K=30
AAAA (last visited Apr. 19, 2004).
240. See supra text accompanying note 125.
241. Ryan, supra note 234, at 289-91.
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